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I. INTRODUCTION
Glenn Koppel's recent work has reminded procedural scholars of the
importance of state rules of civil procedure.' His insight is invaluable. Although state
courts handle the great bulk of civil litigation2 and many state courts employ rules of
procedure that vary significantly from the model of the federal courts, 3 procedural
scholars tend to write and to teach almost exclusively about the federal approach to
civil litigation. I plead as guilty as the next professor to this method.4
Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. I served as a consultant on behalf of Paul Lightner in
CitiFinancial, Inc. v. Lightner and Charlene Shorts in Palisades Collections LLC v. Shorts, two of
the cases referred to in this Article.
1. See Glenn S. Koppel, Toward a New Federalism in State Civil Justice: Developing a Uniform Code
of State Civil Procedure Through a Collaborative Rule-Making Process, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1167
(2005).
2. By one count, in 1991, state courts handled approximately ninety-eight percent of all civil litigation.
See William W Schwarzer & Russell R. Wheeler, On the Federalization of the Administration of
Civil and Criminal Justice, 23 STETSON L. REv. 651, 681 n. 99 (1994) (citing Brian J. Ostrom et al.,
State Court Case Load Statistics: Annual Report 1991 40-44 (Natl. Ctr. for St, Cts. 1993)). A
similar figure emerges from a comparison of recent civil filings. In 2004, the last year for which
complete head-to-head data are available, 16,861,494 civil cases were filed in state courts, and
281,338 cases (including 34,443 removed from state court) were filed in federal court. See Shauna
M. Strickland, Court Statistics Project, State Court Caseload Statistics, 2005 tbl. 1, at 107 (2006)
(available at http://www.ncsconline.org/DResearch/csp/2005_files/State%20Court%20Caseload%
20Statistics%202005.pdf); Leonidas Ralph Mecham, Judicial Business of the U.S. Courts: 2004
Annual Report of the Director tbl. S-7 (Admin. Off. of the U.S. Cts. 2004) (available at http:/lwww.
uscourts.gov/judbus2004/tables/s7.pdf). Although the twelve-month reporting periods vary slightly
in the two reports, these data indicate that in 2004 approximately 98.4 percent of all civil cases were
filed in state court.
3. See John B. Oakley, A Fresh Look at the Federal Rules in State Courts, 3 NEv. L.J. 354 (2003);
John B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coon, The Federal Rules in State Courts: A Survey of State Court
Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1367 (1986).
4. In my co-authored casebook on complex litigation, which is 1,466 pages long, we include fewer
than 50 pages focused on matters of practice in state courts (and even here, the focus is often on the
relationship between state and federal courts), with only a smattering of citations to state-court
decisions elsewhere in the text. See Jay Tidmarsh & Roger H. Trangsrud, Complex Litigation and
the Adversary System, 423-426, 437-448, 698-701, 791-804, 833-844, 865-869 (Found. Press 1998).
In my co-authored casebook on civil procedure, which is 693 pages long, we spend even less time
specifically on state civil procedure; only one principal case, which in edited form is slightly less
than five pages long, arose in state court. See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Suzanna Sherry & Jay
Tidmarsh, Civil Procedure 312-316 (Found. Press 2004).
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Therefore, when Professor Koppel asked that I participate in a panel.
discussing the role of state courts in complex litigation, I agreed with some trepidation.
Many observers regard federal courts as the better home for complex litigation. One
reason is that many common areas of complex litigation - for instance, most
antitrust,5 securities, 6 and patent7 claims - lie exclusively within federal jurisdiction.
In addition, federal courts possess certain natural advantages in complex cases,
including their greater ability to avoid multiple and repetitive litigation through such
devices as loosened rules of personal jurisdiction,8 anti-suit injunctions and stays,9
venue transfers, 10 and, above all, multidistrict transfers." Some commentators claim
that the federal courts' greater resources, limited dockets, and uniform but flexible
system of procedural rules provide other advantages in resolving complex cases.12
Moreover, the interstate nature of most complex litigation leads some commentators
- even those who generally favor a restrained federal presence and a greater role for
state courts in civil litigation - to argue that the federal courts should play the
principal role in complex litigation.13
5. See Gen. Inv. Co. v. Lake Shore & Mich. S. Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 261, 286-288 (1922).
6. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2000); see 15 U.S.C. § 77p(b) (2000) (preempting securities-fraud class actions
asserting violations of state law).
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2000).
8. See e.g. 15 U.S.C. § 22 (2000) (authorizing nationwide service of process in antitrust cases); 15
U.S.C. §§ 77v, 78aa (2000) (authorizing nationwide service of process in securities-fraud cases); 18
U.S.C. § 1965(d) (2000) (authorizing nationwide service of process in RICO cases); 28 U.S.C.
§ 2361 (2000) (authorizing nationwide service of process in statutory interpleader cases); Fed. R.
Civ. P. 4(k)(2) (authorizing nationwide service of process over certain federal-question claims).
9. State courts have no ability to stay proceedings in federal court, see Atomic Co. v. Felter, 434 U.S.
12 (1977), and limited ability to stay proceedings in other state courts, see Tidmarsh & Trangsrud,
supra n. 4, at 470-472. Although the power of federal courts to stay proceedings in state courts or
other federal courts is also limited, it exists in a range of circumstances. See id. at 393-423,
467-470.
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (2000).
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2000).
12. See Sen. Rpt. 109-114 at 14 (Feb. 28, 2005) (reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 15); Jaren Casazza,
Valuation of Diversity Jurisdiction Claims in the Federal Courts, 104 CoLUM. L. REv. 1280, 1312
(2004); John H. Beisner & Jessica Davidson Miller, They're Making a Federal Case Out of It... in
State Court, 25 HA~v. J.L. & PUB. POLICY 143, 151-154 (2001); H. Comm. on the Jud., Hearing on
H.R. 1875, 106th Cong., 107-108 (1999) (prepared testimony of former Attorney General Griffin B.
Bell); William W. Schwarzer et al., Judicial Federalism in Action: Coordination of Litigation in
State and Federal Courts, 78 VA. L. REv. 1689, 1714 (1992); Larry Kramer, Diversity Jurisdiction,
1990 BYU L. REv. 97, 121-123. For a contrary view, see Mark C. Weber, Complex Litigation and
the State Courts: Constitutional and Practical Advantages of the State Forum Over the Federal
Forum in Mass Tort Cases, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 215 (1994).
13. See Sen. Rpt. 109-114 at 23-27 (Feb. 28, 2005) (reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 24-27); Long
Range Plan for the Federal Courts (Jud. Conf. of the U.S. 1995) (available at http://www.uscourts.
gov/lrp/CVRPGTOC.HTM) (recommending federal jurisdiction in cases requiring a "strong need
for uniformity" or "affecting interstate and international commence," but otherwise recommending
limitations on diversity jurisdiction); Fed. Cts. Study Comm., Report of the Federal Courts Study
Committee 38-47 (1990) (reprinted in 22 CONN. L. Rev. 733, 778-787 (1990)) (recommending an
enhanced role for federal courts in complex litigation, but recommending abolition of diversity
jurisdiction in most circumstances). See also Samuel Isaacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey,
Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L. REv. 1353, 1415-1420 (2006) (arguing that the Class Action
Fairness Act of 2005 is part of a more general shift toward federal substantive law and a federal
forum to handle situations affecting national markets).
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The role of state courts in complex litigation received an especially significant
blow when Congress passed the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA).14 The
class action, which allows the aggregation of many related claims into a single case
controlled by one or more class representatives, 15 is perhaps the quintessential
complex-litigation device. Before CAFA, a determined class-action plaintiff who
wanted a state forum could often keep the case in state court - at least for state-law
claims such as commercial disputes, mass torts, and consumer cases. 16 But CAFA
dramatically changed this dynamic. It created a minimal-diversity rule and a relatively
modest amount-in-controversy rule. 17 Although CAFA was crafted to keep small 8
and predominantly local 19 state-law class actions in state court, few class actions can
take advantage of these limitations.20 The goal of CAFA was to move state-law class
actions out of state courts and into federal courts,21 and the recent data show that
CAFA is having its desired effect. Compared to pre-CAFA levels, there has been a
forty-six percent increase in class-action activity - amounting to an additional 26.4
class actions per month - filed in or removed to federal court.22
As the contributions in this Symposium from my colleagues Tom Rowe 23 and
Rich Freer24 show, the federal class-action rule, Rule 23, differs textually in some
important ways from some state class-action rules; and if we also consider the different
interpretations that states adopting the text of Federal Rule 23 sometimes give to their
14. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2(b) 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified at 28
U.S.C.A. §§ 1332(d), 1453, 1711-1715 (West 2006)).
15. For a detailed description of the history, purpose, requirements, and limitations of class actions, see
Jay Tidmarsh & Roger H. Trangsrud, Complex Litigation: Problems in Advanced Civil Procedure
103-163 (Found. Press 2002).
16. On the devices that the plaintiff was able to employ to keep a case in state court, see infra n. 28 and
accompanying text.
17. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1332(d)(2), (d)(6) (West 2006). The statute requires that at least one members of a
plaintiff class be of diverse citizen from at least one defendant and that, in the aggregate, the claims
of the class members must exceed $5,000,000.
18. CAFA does not apply to class actions that contain fewer than 100 class members, see id. at
§ 1332(d)(5)(B), or claims that, in the aggregate, amount to $5,000,000 or less, see id. at
§§ 1332(d)(2), (d)(6).
19. In an intricate set of provisions, CAFA requires a federal district court to decline jurisdiction in
some cases in which two-thirds or more of the class members are from one state, see id. at
§ 1332(d)(4), and permits a federal district court to decline jurisdiction in some cases in which more
than one-third but less than two-thirds of the class members are from one state, see id. at
§ 1332(d)(3).
20. For a related pair of class actions arising from the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, one of which was
held to lie within federal jurisdiction and the other of which was held to fall within an exception to
CAFA's subject-matter jurisdiction, see Preston v. Tenet Healthsystem Meml. Med. Ctr. Inc., 485
F.3d 793 (5th Cir. 2007); Preston v. Tenet Healthsystem Meml. Med. Ctr., Inc, 485 F.3d 804 (5th
Cir. 2007).
21. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2(b), 119 Stat. 4, 5 (2005); Sen. Rpt
109-114 at 6 (Feb. 28, 2005) (reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 6).
22. Thomas E. Willging & Emery G. Lee III, The Impact of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 on
the Federal Courts: Third Interim Report to the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules 2 (Fed. Jud. Ctr. 2007) (available at http://www.fjc.gov/library/fjc-catalog.nsf).
23. Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., State and Foreign Class-Action Rules and Statutes: Differences from - and
Lessons For? - Federal Rule 23, 35 W. ST. U. L. REv. (Fall 2007).
24. Richard D. Freer, Interlocutory Review of Class Action Decisions: An Introductory Empirical Study
of Federal and State Experience, 35 W. ST. U. L. REv. (Fall 2007).
own class-action rules, 25 the gulf between state class-action practice and federal
class-action practice grows wider. But with CAFA in place, the real issue is whether
this divergence matters any more. If one of the most important devices in complex
litigation is the class action, and if CAFA is shutting state courts out of the class-action
business, then the contribution that state courts can make to procedural developments
in the field of complex litigation has been hampered severely.
In this Article, I wish to suggest one place in which state courts can continue
to have an impact on class-action practice: the adjudication of counterclaim class
actions. A counterclaim class action arises when a non-class complaint is filed by a
plaintiff against a defendant, who turns around and asserts against the plaintiff, on
behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals, a counterclaim for relief. In Part II, I
explain the factual, jurisdictional, and legal dynamics of such state-court counterclaim
class actions. In Part III, I argue that counterclaim class actions, when filed in state
court, are not removable to federal court under either the general provision for the
removal of cases from state court or CAFA's specific removal provision. The analysis
is essentially textual; the language of the removal statutes commands this result,
despite policy arguments that might be mustered in favor of an expansive federal
jurisdiction over cases containing class allegations. The analysis thus brings up the
age-old tension between text and purpose; but in the area of removal, text has always
had a controlling effect on the outcome. And so it should here. CAFA might have
shifted the tide of class action practice toward the federal shore, but it has left some
wading room for state courts to contribute to the development of the law of class
actions.
II. CONSUMERS AND COUNTERCLAIM CLASS ACTIONS
This Part sets the table by addressing two preliminary matters. First, I
describe the factual and jurisdictional dynamics that lead a defendant to plead a
counterclaim class action in state court. Second, I examine whether the rules of
joinder provide the defendant with the legal authority to do so.
A. The Dynamics of Counterclaim Class Actions
The principal context in which counterclaim class actions have thus far been
employed is commercial litigation. In the typical scenario, one party to a contract -
25. Compare e.g. Gen. Tel. Co. of the S.W. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982) (requiring a "rigorous
analysis" of the requirements of Federal Rule 23) and Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463
(1978) (refusing to allow immediate appeal of a decision denying class certification), superceded by
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f) (permitting discretionary appeals of decisions granting or denying
certification), with The Money Place, L.L.C. v. Barnes, 78 S.W.3d 730, 733-734 (Ark. 2002)
(declining to adopt the federal courts' "rigorous analysis" for a class action certified under Rule 23
of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure, which was identical in relevant language to Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure), and Butler v. Audio/Video Affiliates Inc., 611 So. 2d 330, 331
(Ala. 1992) (allowing immediate appeal from an order refusing to certify a class under Rule 23 of
the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure).
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usually a consumer - fails to make a required payment under the contract to the other
party - usually a financial institution that sells credit, mortgage, or insurance
products. State law defines the parties' contractual rights. Although the financial
institution might be of diverse citizenship from the consumer, the amount that the
consumer owes on the contract is small, far less than the $75,000.01 jurisdictional
amount necessary to invoke federal jurisdiction.26 Hence, in order to recover on the
contract, the financial institution sues the consumer in state court.
At that point, the consumer realizes that a term in the contract arguably
violates state consumer-protection, creditor-debtor, or insurance-regulation laws. The
consumer's individual remedy for this alleged violation is modest. But because the
offending provision in the contract is standard, the financial institution has also entered
into the same agreement with many other consumers. In the aggregate, the institution
faces a large potential liability.
In this circumstance, a consumer who wishes to vindicate the rights of
similarly situated consumers has two options. One is to file a class action as an
independent suit. The second is to assert a counterclaim against the financial
institution in the state-court action.
After CAFA, the choice between these two options is likely to turn on whether
the consumer wishes to litigate in federal or state court. If the consumer brings an
independent action, then the case is probably destined for federal court. Assuming
diverse citizenship between the creditor and at least one consumer, and further
assuming that the total amount of the creditor's alleged wrongdoing exceeds
$5,000,000, CAFA supplies the necessary jurisdiction for a consumer who wishes to
file in federal court.27 But the consumer might prefer state court. Before CAFA, a
consumer who wished to avoid a federal forum avoided pleading any federal
questions, and then either named a class representative who was not diverse from the
financial institution or ensured that no class representative had a claim exceeding the
jurisdictional amount in controversy. 28 After CAFA, however, holding onto the state
forum becomes more difficult. As long as the parties are minimally diverse and more
than $5,000,000 is at stake, the financial institution can remove a case filed in state
court to federal court29 - and it likely will do So. 30 Unless the consumer's stand-alone
26. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2000) (providing federal jurisdiction over claims based on state law when
the parties are of diverse citizenship and "the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of$75,000").
27. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(d)(2) (West 2006).
28. Before the passage of CAFA, the traditional rule for diversity-based class actions was that each class
representative, although not each class member, needed to be of diverse citizenship from each party
opposing the class. Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 366 (1921). In addition,
each class representative needed to have a claim exceeding the jurisdictional amount in controversy.
Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 336 (1969). So did each class member. Zahn v. Intl. Paper Co.,
414 U.S. 291, 301 (1973). Although the text itself was ambiguous, the Supreme Court has recently
held that 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b), enacted in 1990, superceded Zahn, so that as long as each class
representative has a claim exceeding the jurisdictional amount, the class members need not have
such claims. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 549 (2005).
29. For the statutory sources authorizing the financial institution to remove, see infra Part III.A.
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class suit falls into CAFA's discretionary 31 or mandatory32 exceptions to jurisdiction,
the case is likely to be adjudicated in federal court - regardless of the consumer's
preference for state court.
Therefore, a consumer wishing to hold onto the state forum must turn to the
second option - filing a counterclaim class action - and hope that CAFA does not
authorize removal. Precisely this tactic has been used in a series of recent cases. For
example, in Progressive West Insurance Co. v. Preciano,33 an insurance company sued
in state court seeking reimbursement for $5,000 in medical payments it made on behalf
of the insured. The insured argued that the company's "policy of claiming such
reimbursements was an unfair business practice under California's unfair competition
law. '34 It filed a cross-complaint - the equivalent under California procedure of a
counterclaim in federal court35  - against the insurance company. The
cross-complaint sought not only a remedy for the insured, but also "remedies 'on
behalf of the general public,"' 36 thus converting the cross-complaint into a class
action.37
Similarly, in CitiFinancial, Inc. v. Lightner,38 a financial institution provided
three loans, in the total amount of $15,892.22, to a consumer in West Virginia.39 For
two of the loans, the consumer also purchased credit insurance, which, in return for a
premium rolled into the loan, guaranteed the loan payments in the event of the
consumer's death or disability.40 The consumer allegedly defaulted on the loans, and
the financial institution sued in West Virginia state court to recover $6,645.10.41
During the course of the litigation, the consumer alleged that the financial institution
had overcharged for the credit insurance, thus violating West Virginia's
consumer-protection laws.42 As a result, the consumer filed a counterclaim in state
30. Indeed, the greatest growth in federal class-action practice after CAFA has been in the areas of
contract disputes and fraud. See Willging & Lee, supra n. 22, at 2, 15.
31. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(d)(3) (West 2006).
32. See id. at § 1332(d)(4).
33. 479 F.3d 1014 (9th Cir. 2007).
34. Id. at 1015.
35. Id. at 1015 n. 1; compare Cal. Civ. Proc. Code Ann. § 428.10 (West 2004) (permitting
cross-complaints by "[a] party against whom a cause of action has been asserted") with Fed. R. Civ.
Proc. 13(a) (permitting a compulsory counterclaim that "the pleader has against any opposing
party") and Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(b) (permitting a permissive counterclaim by a pleader "against an
opposing party").
36. Progressive W., 479 F.3d at 1015.
37. California law specifically provides that class actions may be used to enforce the terms of its
unfair-competition act, as long as the requirements of its class-action rule are met. Cal. Bus. & Prof.
Code Ann. § 17203 (West Supp. 2007). On the general requirements for maintaining a class action
(which California calls a "representative action"), see Cal. Civ. Proc. Code Ann. § 382 (West 2004).
38. 2007 WL 1655225 (N.D. W. Va. June 6, 2007).
39. See Pet. of CitiFinancial, Inc. to App. Order of Remand Pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act,
28 U.S.C. § 1453, and Appendix to Pet. at 4-5, CitiFinancial, 2007 WL 1655225 (hereinafter "Pet.
of CitiFinancial") (copy on file with author).
40. Id. at 5. The financial institution in the case, CitiFinancial, claimed that it was not itself an insurer,
and that the insurance was underwritten by two Texas corporations. In selling credit insurance to
consumers, CitiFinancial's employees were, according to CitiFinancial, acting as agents of the
Texas companies. Id.
41. CitiFinancial, Inc. v. Lightner, 2007 WL 3088087 (N.D. W. Va. Oct. 22, 2007).
42. CitiFinancial, Inc. v. Lightner, 2007 WL 1655225 at *1 (N.D. W. Va. June 6, 2007).
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court. Because the financial institution allegedly overcharged many other consumers,
the consumer brought the counterclaim as a class action.43 The aggregate potential
liability faced by the financial institution in the counterclaim was, by its own
admission, $40,000,000. 44
Progressive West and CitiFinancial are illustrative cases, and reveal just the
tip of an approaching iceberg.45 If consumers can successfully avoid federal court with
this tactic, and assuming that state law permits certification of the counterclaim as a
class action, the state case suddenly transforms from an individual action with $75,000
or less at stake into a class suit with more than $5,000,000 at stake. The entire
litigation dynamic and its center of gravity switches in an instant. Faced with this
reality, financial institutions will need to think carefully before they file collection
actions in state courts in which they do not wish to defend their credit and lending
policies.
Predictably, in both Progressive West and CitiFinancial, the financial
institutions sought a way out of this dilemma: They invoked CAFA and removed the
cases to federal court. Arguing that CAFA provided no authority to remove
counterclaim class actions, the consumers moved to remand the cases to state court.
Before evaluating the merits of their remand argument, however, it is necessary to
consider one possible roadblock in the consumers' litigation strategy: Whether they
can assert a class action claim by means of a counterclaim.
B. Asserting Class-Action Counterclaims Under State Procedural Codes
Because the consumer files the counterclaim class action in state court, the
question of the legal authority to entertain such a counterclaim turns on state law.
Although this issue is logically the first question to address, in the real world it is
unlikely that the issue will be litigated until later in the case, if at all. When faced with
43. CitiFinancial, Inc. v. Lightner, 2007 WL 3088087 (N.D. W. Va. Oct. 22, 2007). West Virginia has
largely adopted the language of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Hence, at the time that the
consumer filed his counterclaim, West Virginia's Rule 13, which governed counterclaims, was
identical to the then-extant Federal Rule 13. See W. Va. R. Civ. P. 13(a), (b). Its Rule 23, dealing
with class actions, was essentially the same as the then-extant Federal Rule 23, although West
Virginia had not adopted the 1998 and 2003 amendments to Federal Rule 23 that revised Federal
Rule 23(e) and added Federal Rule 23(f)-(h). See W. Va. R. Civ. P. 23. Unless West Virginia
adopts the 2007 amendments that restyled the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, its Rule 13 will
vary slightly in language, although not in meaning, from Federal Rule 13; and its Rule 23 will vary
somewhat more from Federal Rule 23.
44. Pet. of CitiFinancial, supra n. 39, at 1.
45. See also Palisades Collections LLC v. Shorts, 2008 WL 163677 (N.D. W. Va. Jan. 16, 2008)
(ordering remand of case brought by creditor in which the consumer-defendant asserted a state-law
counterclaim class action); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Jones, 2007 WL 2236616 (N.D. Ohio July 31,
2007) (same); Williamsburg Plantation, Inc. v. Bluegreen Corp., 478 F. Supp. 2d 861, 865 (E.D. Va.
2006) (ordering remand to state court of case involving a federal-question counterclaim class
action); Unifund CCR Partners v. Wallis, 2006 WL 908755 at *1 (D.S.C. Apr. 7, 2006) (ordering
remand of case brought by creditor against debtors in which one debtor asserted a state-law
counterclaim class action). For a pre-CAFA case also involving a consumer's assertion of a
state-court counterclaim class action, see Gen. Elec. Capital Auto Lease, Inc. v. Mires, 788 F. Supp.
948, 950 (E.D. Mich. 1992) (remanding case to state court).
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a counterclaim class action in state court, the financial institution's likely first move,
as Progressive West and CitiFinancial show, will be to remove the case to federal
court.46 Once the notice of removal is filed, proceedings in state court stop, 47 and the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure control the course of the action in federal court.48
Only if the case remanded to state court will the authority to assert a counterclaim
class action under state law again become a live question.
Nonetheless, because it is logically the first question, and because the issue
will also arise under federal procedural law if the case is successfully removed to
federal court, it is worth analyzing the issue now. Here is the problem. Classically, a
counterclaim is a claim asserted by someone already a party (usually a defendant)
against an opposing party (usually a plaintiff).49 But a counterclaim class action does
not exactly fit this mold. A counterclaim class action not only asserts one classic
counterclaim (the defendant's claim against the plaintiff) but it also asserts the claims
of persons who are not already parties. Unless a state's joinder rules allow the joinder
of new parties (and in particular, new class members) on the counterclaim, then the
defendant's effort to create a counterclaim class action fails ab initio.
In analyzing this question, let me step over briefly to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Under the Federal Rules, the assertion of counterclaims is controlled
by Rule 13(a) (dealing with compulsory counterclaims) and Rule 13(b) (dealing with
permissive counterclaims). Both rules contemplate that a counterclaim will be
asserted by an existing party against an existing and opposing party.50 Neither rule
makes provision for the joinder of additional parties to the counterclaim. Instead, to
determine whether the joinder of additional parties is appropriate, we must look to
Rule 13(h), which provides: "Rules 19 and 20 govern the addition of a person as a
party to a counterclaim or crossclaim."51
This language is not entirely helpful to a consumer pleading a counterclaim
class action. The addition of class members is governed by Rule 23, not Rules 19 or
46. A civil action must be removed to federal court "within thirty days after receipt by the defendant"
that shows the case is or has become removable. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2000). Failing to remove the
case within thirty days waives the right to removal. See Rosebud Holding, L.L.C. v. Burks, 995 F.
Supp. 465, 467 (D.N.J. 1998) ("While the thirty day time period in which to remove is not
jurisdictional, it is a strictly applied rule of procedure that may not be extended by the court.");
Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure vol. 14C, § 3732, 324 (3d ed., West
1998) (noting that the thirty-day rule is "mandatory in terms of ... scope and character"); id. at
329-331 (describing limited exceptions to the thirty-day rule). Because it is unlikely that the
plaintiff facing a counterclaim class action could get a ruling on the state procedural issue within
thirty days, the plaintiff is unlikely to tarry in state court, and will instead file the notice of removal.
47. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d) (2000).
48. Fed. R. Civ. P. 81(c).
49. Other parties can also assert counterclaims. For instance, a third-party defendant can assert a
counterclaim against a third-party plaintiff. Cf Fed. R. Civ. P. 14(a)(2)(B) (authorizing such a
counterclaim at the federal level).
50. For the relevant language of Rules 13(a) and (b), see Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a) (permitting a compulsory
counterclaim that "the pleader has against any opposing party") and Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(b)
(permitting a permissive counterclaim by a pleader "against an opposing party").
51. Before the restyling of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 2007, Rule 13(h) had read: "Persons
other than those made parties to the original action may be made parties to a counterclaim or
cross-claim in accordance with the provisions of Rules 19 and 20."
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20. Therefore, if a consumer were to file a counterclaim class action in federal court,
the financial institution might well argue that, because the counterclaim class action
seeks to add parties under Rule 23 rather than under Rules 19 or 20, Rule 13(h) renders
the joinder fatally defective.
But the issue is not quite so simple; there are two arguments that Rule 13(h)
has no application in the context of counterclaim class actions. First, some cases have
held that a class member is not an "opposing party" within the meaning of Rules 13(a)
and (b), so that counterclaims cannot be asserted against them.52 Extending this
argument, it is possible that class members in a class-action counterclaim are not
"person[s]" added as part[ies]" within the meaning of Rule 13(h). Indeed, Rule 23 is
more a rule of preclusion than a rule of joinder; class members are "parties" only in a
fictional sense.53 Second, the much neglected Rule 19(d) provides: "This rule [Rule
19] is subject to Rule 23." 54 Rule 19(d) is generally understood to exempt class
actions from Rule 19's strictures -in particular, Rule 19(c)'s requirement to list all
known parties subject to joinder under Rule 19(a) and Rule 19(b)'s draconian
dismissal of a case for a party's failure to join indispensable parties. 55 In this context,
Rule 19(d) arguably does other work; it opens the door a crack to permit counterclaim
class actions. Rule 13(h) allows the joinder of additional parties on a counterclaim
pursuant to either Rule 19 or Rule 20, and Rule 19(d) makes joinder under Rule 19
subject to Rule 23. Transitively, Rule 13(h) allows Rule 23 joinder on a counterclaim.
This argument that Rule 13(h) acts as no bar to counterclaim class actions is
hardly airtight, but it enjoys some policy support. In general, the joinder provisions of
the Federal Rules allow the assertion of new claims and the assertion of claims against
new parties on a capacious basis. The basic theory of joinder under the Federal Rules
is transactionalism: As long as joinder is consistent with efficiency and due process,
parties should be able to join all related transactions and occurrences in a single case.56
52. See e.g. Donson Stores, Inc. v. Am. Bakeries Co., 58 F.R.D. 485, 488-489 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); but see
Natl. Super Spuds, Inc. v. N.Y. Mercantile Exch., 75 F.R.D. 40, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (permitting
counterclaims to be asserted against class members). See generally In re Four Seasons Sec. Is.
Litig., 525 F.2d 500, 504 (10th Cir. 1975) (discussing the purposes for which a class member is and
is not regarded as a party); Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure vol. 6,
§ 1404, 25 & n. 19 (2d ed., West 1990) (collecting cases on both sides of the issue).
53. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41 (1940) (describing class actions as "bind[ing] members of the
class or those represented who were not made parties to it"); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762 n. 2
(1989) (describing class actions as a device by which "a person, although not a party, has his
interests adequately represented by someone with the same interests who is a party").
54. Before the restyling of the Fed. R. Civ P. in 2007, Rule 19(d) had read: "This rule is subject to the
provisions of Rule 23."
55. See Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure vol. 7, § 1626 (3d ed., West 2001).
In brief, Rule 19 states a rule of mandatory joinder, under which nonparties whose absence creates
certain types of unfairness must be joined if feasible. See Fed. R. Civ P. 19(a)(1)-(2) (listing three
types of parties who must be joined). In the event that such nonparties cannot be joined, the court
has the authority, in some situations, to dismiss the entire case. See Fed. R. Civ P. 19(b). For a
more extended treatment of Rule 19, see Jay Tidmarsh & Roger H. Trangsrud, Complex Litigation:
Problems in Advanced Civil Procedure 103-163 (Found. Press 2002).
56. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1281, 1290
(1976); Suzanna Sherry & Jay Tidmarsh, Civil Procedure Essentials 185-206 (Aspen Publishers
2007); Mosley v. Gen. Motors Corp., 497 F.2d 1330, 1333 (8th Cir. 1974). In certain regards,
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Despite this general orientation, the literal text of the Federal Rules on occasion fails
to authorize the joinder of a particular claim or party, thus frustrating the Rules' liberal
spirit. In such cases, federal courts have often chosen spirit over text, even when they
had less of a hook than Rule 19(d) to hang the result on.57 Indeed, in the context of
Rule 13(h), one set of commentators has noted:
Rule 13(h) should be applied to further the general objectives of Rule
13. Therefore, courts have construed subdivision (h) liberally in an
effort to avoid a multiplicity of litigation, minimize the circuitry of
actions, and foster judicial economy. Stated in general terms, the
main purpose of Rule 13(h) is to dispose of an action in its entirety
and to grant complete relief to all the concerned parties.58
Longstanding practice in federal court also appears hospitable to counterclaim
class actions. In the course of making rulings on other issues, numerous federal
decisions have mentioned in passing the presence of pending counterclaim class
actions. 59 Among all of these decisions, I have not found a single case suggesting that
counterclaim class actions are precluded by the language of Rule 13(h). If anything,
the frequency with which such counterclaims are asserted in federal court and the
tolerance of federal courts toward them indicate that they are an accepted part of
federal joinder practice.
joinder is even permitted beyond the scope of the transaction or occurrence. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
13(b), 18(a).
57. For instance, one court permitted the joinder of an additional claim under the former Rule 14(a),
which contained an intricate series of rules authorizing joinder but which failed to authorize the
joinder of a particular claim in the unique circumstances presented in the case. See Thomas v.
Barton Lodge 1I Ltd., 174 F.3d 636, 652 (5th Cir. 1999) (arguing that a literal reading of Rule 14(a)
that prevented the joinder of an additional claim against an existing party was "strained" and
"nonsensical"); but see Asher v. Unarco Material Handling Co., 2008 WL 130858 (E.D. Ky. Jan.
10, 2008) (rejecting Thomas).
58. See Wright et al., supra n. 52, at § 1434, 268-270 (footnotes omitted).
59. For a representative sampling, see Discover Bank v. Vaden, 396 F.3d 366, 371 (4th Cir. 2007)
(holding that state-law class-action counterclaims in pending state-court action were preempted);
McLaughlin v. Miss. Power Co., 376 F.3d 344, 354 (1 1th Cir. 2004) (dismissing counterclaim class
action due to the lack of diversity of one of the class representatives); Frank's Casing Crew &
Rental Tools, Inc. v. PMR Techs. Ltd., 292 F.3d 1363, 1371-1372 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that the
filing of a counterclaim class action waived a defendant's ability to claim a lack of personal
jurisdiction); Channell v. Citicorp Natl. Serv. Inc., 89 F.3d 379, 387 (7th Cir. 1996) (remanding case
to district court to consider whether to exercise jurisdiction over a counterclaim class action asserted
in response to a plaintiff class action); Pa. Dental Assn. v. Med. Serv. Assn. of Pa., 745 F.2d 248,
263 (3d Cir. 1984) (finding that the purported class representative for a counterclaim class action
was inadequate); U.S. v. 2,200 Paper Back Bks., 565 F.2d 566, 573 (9th Cir. 1977) (dismissing
counterclaim class action for undue delay); All Am. Airways v. Elderd, 209 F.2d 247, 249 (2d Cir.
1954) (holding that the dismissal of a counterclaim class action was not immediately appealable);
Vodak v. City of Chi., 2006 WL 2524141 at *3 (N.D. I11. Aug. 30, 2006) (asserting supplemental
jurisdiction over a counterclaim class action; noting that "[a] counterclaim in a class action is the
equivalent of a defendant class action"); Sandwich Chef of Tex., Inc. v. Reliance Natl. Indem. Ins.
Co., 202 F.R.D. 212, 216 (S.D. Tex. 2001) (ordering a counterclaim class action to be severed from
the main case); H & R Block, Ltd. v. Housden, 186 F.R.D. 399, 401 (E.D. Tex. 1999) (denying the
certification of a counterclaim class action that alleged a violation of the Federal Labor Standards
Act); Gen. Elec. Capital Auto Lease, Inc. v. Mires, 788 F. Supp. 948, 951 (E.D. Mich. 1992)
(remanding a case with a counterclaim class action to state court).
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It is not necessary, however, to inquire further into federal practice. My
detour into the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was only for the purpose of defining
the problem in the familiar language of federal procedure. In the situation that this
Article addresses, the counterclaim class action has been filed in state, not federal,
court; thus, state law, not federal law, determines the legitimacy of joining a class of
new parties to a counterclaim.
Because state joinder rules are not monolithic, the propriety of asserting a
counterclaim class action ultimately hinges on the language and interpretation of each
state's joinder rules. Again, the facts of Progressive West Insurance Co. v. Preciano60
and CitiFinancial, Inc. v. Lightner6' present illustrative studies. Progressive West
arose in California state court, which employs a set of detailed procedural codes and
statutes very different from the loosely textured Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In
Progressive West, the consumer defendant had filed a cross-complaint (the equivalent
of a counterclaim) under the authority of section 428.10 of the California Civil
Procedure Code.62 The very next provision in the Code, section 428.20, is the
counterpart to Federal Rule 13(h):
When a person files a cross-complaint as authorized by Section
428.10, he may join any person as a cross-complainant or
cross-defendant, whether or not such person is already a party to the
action, if, had the cross-complaint been filed as an independent action,
the joinder of that party would have been permitted by the statutes
governing joinder of parties.63
Thus, contrary to the ambiguous authority for counterclaim class actions in federal
procedure, California authorizes counterclaim class actions, as long as the
counterclaim meets the requirements for certification as a representative action under
California law.64
CitiFinancial presents a trickier case. CitiFinancial arose in West Virginia
state court. West Virginia has essentially adopted the language of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure as its own. In particular, it has adopted Rule 13(h). 65 Therefore, the
arguments that I have already sketched about the power of a federal court to entertain a
counterclaim class action66 essentially replicate themselves in the context of the power
of West Virginia's courts to entertain a counterclaim class action of the type asserted
60. 479 F.3d 1014, 1018 (9th Cir. 2007).
61. 2007 WL 1655225 (N.D. W. Va. June 6, 2007).
62. 479 F.3d at 1015.
63. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 428.20 (2004).
64. Progressive West, which held only that the assertion of a counterclaim class action in state court did
not make the case removable under CAFA, never raised the issue of a California court's power to
hear a counterclaim class action). See 479 F.3d at 1018.
65. West Virginia's Rule 13(h) is identical to the version in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure before
the 2007 amendments restyled Federal Rule 13(h). For the difference in language between the
former Federal Rule 13(h) (and the still-existing West Virginia Rule 13(h)) and the present Federal
Rule 13(h), see supra n. 51 and accompanying text. Because the 2007 amendments were intended
only to restyle Rules 13's language, but not to change its substance, see Fed. R. Civ P. 13 advisory
committee note, Federal Rule 13(h) and West Virginia Rule 13(h) are functionally identical.
66. See supra nn. 50-59 and accompanying text.
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in CitiFinancial. The principal difference is the lack of any West Virginia cases
discussing the use of counterclaim class actions,67 so that it is unclear whether
counterclaim class actions are part of a longstanding practice in West Virginia state
courts.
6 8
Although I have not exhaustively determined the hospitability of each state to
the counterclaim class action, my research suggests fairly broad acceptance. 69 New
York courts have allowed them,70 as have courts in Arizona,71 Arkansas,72 Florida,73
Indiana,74 and Michigan.75 An appellate court in Ohio noted the question, and
appeared willing to allow counterclaim class actions as long as they met Ohio's
requirements for class certification; 76 in an earlier case, a trial court in Ohio had
certified a counterclaim class action. 77 Although perhaps less numerous than at the
federal level, counterclaim class actions are not uncommon among the state courts,
67. I conducted a search on Westlaw using the database of West Virginia cases ("WV-CS") and the
command "(counterclaim or crossclaim) /100 'class action."' The search netted two cases, neither of
which involved a counterclaim class action.
68. Like Progressive West, CitiFinancial held only that the assertion of counterclaim class actions did
not make the case removable under CAFA; it did not address the ability to assert a counterclaim
class action under either West Virginia or federal law. CitiFinancial, 2007 WL 1655225 at *3,
69. I conducted a search on Westlaw using the database of all state cases ("ALLSTATES") and the
command "counterclaim /10 'class action.'" The search netted 129 cases, many of which involved
other issues, such as the assertion of counterclaims in a standard plaintiff class action.
70. See Compact Electra Corp. v. Paul, 93 Misc. 2d 807, 810 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977) (permitting the
assertion of a counterclaim class action regarding certain violations of state law, but not other
violations of state and federal law); cf Am. Express Travel Related Servs., Inc. v. Caplan, 266
A.D.2d 325, 326 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (summarily holding that certification of a counterclaim
class action was inappropriate "[u]nder the facts and circumstances of this case"); Cornell U. v.
Dickerson, 100 Misc. 2d 198, 206 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979) (refusing to certify a counterclaim class
action on the merits); Natl. Bank of Westchester v. Pisani, 58 A.D.2d 597, 598 (N.Y. App. Div.
1977) (also refusing to certify a counterclaim class action on the merits).
71. Lennon v. First Natl. Bank of Ariz., 518 P.2d 1230, 1234-1235 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1974).
72. Carquest of Hot Springs, Inc. v. Gen. Parts Inc., 204 S.W.3d 53, 58 (2005). In earlier cases, the
Arkansas Supreme Court had held the contrary, stating that a consumer counterclaim class action
"seems to be entirely beyond the scope of the counterclaim statute." Tucker v. Pulaski Fed. Say. &
Loan Assn., 481 S.W.2d 725, 731 (1972); Reynolds v. Bakem Credit Union, 500 S.W.2d 355, 356
(1973) (reaffirming Tucker). Carquest neither overruled the earlier cases nor explained its reversal
in course. The likeliest explanation is that Tucker and Reynolds involved the interpretation of
former § 27-1121 of the Arkansas Code, which used to govern the pleading of counterclaims. Ark.
Stat. Ann. § 27-1121 (Repl. 1962). Section 27-1121 was subsequently superseded by Rule 13 of the
Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure. See Ark. R. Civ. P. 13 reporter's note (noting that § 27-1121
had been superceded). At the time of Carquest, Arkansas Rule 13 was in all material respects the
same as the then-extant Federal Rule 13; in particular, Arkansas Rule 13(g) was identical to the
then-extant Federal Rule 13(h). See Ark. R. Civ. P. 13; supra n. 51 and accompanying text
(providing text of former and restyled Federal Rule 13(h)). Carquest's result provides further
support for the view that the "Rules 19 or 20" language of Federal Rule 13(h), see supra nn. 51,
54-55 and accompanying text, imposes no absolute bar to the assertion of counterclaim class
actions.
73. Lanca Homeowners, Inc. v. Lantana Cascade of Palm Beach Ltd., 541 So. 2d 1121, 1124-1125 (Fla.
1988).
74. Lake County Trust Co. v. Wine, 704 N.E.2d 1035, 1044 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998).
75. Adair v. City of Det., 198 Mich. App. 506, 511 (1993) (defendant in a class action could itself file a
counterclaim class action against the plaintiff class).
76. See Tammac Corp. v. Norch, 2003 WL 21224229 at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. May 27, 2003) (noting "a
certain paucity in case law analysis of counterclaimants seeking class certification").
77. Car Now Acceptance Co. v. Block, 2002 WL 32001272 at *8 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pleas Nov. 25, 2002).
But see Terminal Supply Co. v. Farley, 1991 WL 1577 at *7 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 11, 1991)
(affirming a trial court's refusal to certify a counterclaim class action); Cardinal Fed. Sav. & Loan
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which have often noted, without negative comment, the presence of a pending
counterclaim class action.7 Also of interest is the Model Class Actions Act, whose
section 11 provides detailed rules for handling counterclaims in class actions,
including a rule permitting a defendant class or its members to counterclaim against a
plaintiff class or its members; the Model Act, however, makes no general reference to
the power of a trial court to entertain a counterclaim class action.79 With the exception
of two Arkansas cases that are no longer good law,80 none of the cases or authorities
suggest that a state's joinder rules bar the pleading of counterclaim class actions. For
present purposes, I need go no further. Assuming that a counterclaim class action is
certifiable under a state's class-action requirements, at least some states allow them to
be asserted. Therefore, I can turn to the principal issue in this Article: Whether a
state-court counterclaim class action is removable to federal court under CAFA.
81
v. Michaels Bldg. Co., 1987 WL 31932 at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 23, 1987) (also affirming a trial
court's refusal to certify a counterclaim class action).
78. For instance, in Health Costs Controls v. Sevilla, 718 N.E.2d 558 (Ill. App. 1999), the court held
that a trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction over a counterclaim class action even after the main
claim was terminated; although the court implicitly assumed that such counterclaims were
appropriate, it never so held. See also Ex Parte Green Tree Fin. Corp., 723 So. 2d 6 (Ala. 1998)
(denying certification of a counterclaim class action on the merits); First Life Assurance Co. v.
Mountain, 848 P.2d 1177 (Okla. App. 1993) (same); Prime Meats, Inc. v. Yochim, 619 A.2d 769
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (same); GMAC Mortg. Corp. of Pa. v. Stapleton, 603 N.E.2d 767 (Ill. App.
1992) (affirming the settlement of a counterclaim class action); Parker Co. v. Spindletop Oil & Gas
Co., 628 S.W.2d 765 (Tex. 1982) (indicating a willingness, in appropriate circumstances, to
consider certification of a counterclaim class action brought against members of a plaintiff class
action); First Am. Natl. Bank of Nashville v. Hunter, 581 S.W.2d 655 (Tenn. App. 1978) (denying
certification of a counterclaim class action on the merits). Cf Miss. Code Ann. § 75-24-15(4) (West
1999) (by statute precluding counterclaim class actions in disputes arising under certain consumer
contracts).
79. Model Class Actions [Act] [Rule], § 11, 12 U.L.A. 114 (1996). In particular, § 11(d) provides in
relevant part and § 1 1(e) provides in full:
(d)A defendant class may plead as a counterclaim any claim on behalf of the class that
the court certifies as a class action against the plaintiff. The court may certify as a
class action a counterclaim against the plaintiff on behalf of a subclass or permit a
counterclaim by a member of the class....
(e)A member of a class or subclass asserting a counterclaim shall be treated as a
member of a plaintiff class for purposes of exclusion under Section 8.
In any event, the ambiguities of this language have little effect on the general question of the power
of state courts to entertain counterclaim class actions. Only Iowa and North Dakota have adopted
the Model Act. Model Class Actions [Act] [Rule], 12 U.L.A. 43 tbl. 1 (Supp. 2006).
80. See supra n. 72.
81. As an aside, however, this brief investigation into state procedure loops back to Professor Koppel's
concern, as well as to the theme of this Symposium: the need to understand better the workings of
state-court procedure and the desirability of using state-court procedure as a resource for the
improvement of procedure at all levels. Although I do not suggest that the ambiguity over the
power of federal and some state courts to entertain counterclaim class actions should be the catalyst
driving us onto the ramparts of procedural reform, this one scenario, tucked away into a comer of
joinder practice, provides an example of the ways in which federal and state courts can learn from
the ways in which other state courts have handled comparable issues within their own jurisdictions.
III. TIHE NON-REMOVABILITY OF STATE-COURT
COUNTERCLAIM CLASS ACTIONS
It is hornbook law that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction; the
federal district courts possess only the subject-matter jurisdiction that the Constitution
and Congress give them.82 Congress has enacted numerous statutes granting the
district courts original jurisdiction over various subject matters.83 Since the Judiciary
Act of 1789, Congress has also provided for removal jurisdiction, allowing certain
cases that are originally filed in state court to be removed to federal court.84 A case is
removable only if its subject matter lies within federal jurisdiction and Congress has
enacted a statute permitting removal.85
Removal provisions are scattered throughout the United States Code,86 and on
appropriate and unique facts, any of these statutes might serve as the basis for removal
of a case containing a counterclaim class action. But only two provisions have
arguable applicability in the context of most counterclaim class actions: the catch-all
removal provision, 28 U.S.C. section 1441, and the removal provision created by
CAFA, 28 U.S.C. section 1453(b).
In this Part, I demonstrate that neither of these provisions allows the removal
of a case simply because it contains a counterclaim class action. More than sixty years
ago, the Supreme Court held that the predecessor to section 1441 does not authorize
removal by plaintiffs, even when they become counterclaim defendants. 8 7 Nothing in
the language or structure of section 1453(b) changes that result in the specific context
of counterclaim class actions.
Faced with this reality, a financial institution facing a consumer's state-court
counterclaim class action can employ one other tactic to achieve the federal forum: ask
the federal court to realign the parties, thus converting the financial institution from the
plaintiff into the defendant and allowing it to remove the case. This Part concludes by
showing that the realignment doctrine was never intended to allow a counterclaim
defendant to manipulate federal jurisdiction in this way. Therefore, this tactic also
fails to obtain a federal forum to hear a state-court counterclaim class action.
82. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 552 (2005); Kokkonen v. Guardian Life
Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994).
83. The principal grants are found in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330-1369, but miscellaneous grants of
subject-matter jurisdiction are sprinkled across myriad federal statutes. See e.g. Pub. L. No. 58-54,
§ 2, 33 Stat. 599, 600 (1905) (granting the Red Cross the right to "sue and be sued" in federal court).
84. Jud. Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 12, 1 Stat. 73, 79 (1845). Although the Constitution does not specifically
provide for or even mention removal jurisdiction, the constitutionality of removal jurisdiction is
today beyond cavil. See Tenn. v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257 (1879).
85. Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure vol. 14B, § 3721 (3d ed., West 1998).
86. See e.g. Fin. Instns. Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(a)(ll)
(2000) (providing the Thrift Depositor Oversight Board with a right of removal); id. at § 1441a(/)(3)
(providing the Resolution Trust Corporation with a right of removal).
87. See infra nn. 95-124 and accompanying text.
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A. The Removal Statutes and Counterclaim Class Actions
This Section first examines a counterclaim defendant's ability to remove a
case under section 1441, and then explores the counterclaim defendant's ability to
remove a counterclaim class action under section 1453(b). This order might appear
backward: It seems more direct to go straight to section 1453(b), which specifically
concerns the removal of class actions. Because the baseline rule of section 1441 helps
to inform the meaning of section 1453(b), however, I begin with section 1441 before
turning to the murkier section 1453(b).
1. Removal Under 28 U.S.C. §1441(a)
Section 1441(a) provides in relevant part:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil
action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the
United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the
defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States
for the district and division embracing the place where such action is
pending.
This sentence places three limits on removal. First, Congress must not otherwise
preclude removal.8  Second, if the case had originally been filed in federal, rather than
state, court, a federal court must have had subject-matter jurisdiction over the case.
Third, the removal must be made by "the defendant or defend'ants." Other provisions
in sections 1441(b) and 1446(b) - which will become significant when we examine
section 1453(b)89 - also place important restrictions on the right of removal.
Notably, a defendant in a diversity case cannot remove a case from a court in the
defendant's home state;90 removal must occur within thirty days of the date on which
the case first becomes removable; 91 and a diversity-based case is not removable once it
has been pending in state court for more than one year, regardless of when the case
first became removable. 92 Additionally, when a plaintiff sues more than one
defendant, the Supreme Court has required that the defendants unanimously consent to
removal.93
88. On rare occasion, Congress has made certain actions non-removable. See 28 U.S.C. § 1445 (2000)
(making Jones Act, workers' compensation, and other actions non-removable); 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a)
(2000) (making state-law fraud claims not asserted as a class action non-removable); Wright et al.,
supra n. 46, at § 3729 (discussing other statutes that have been interpreted to preclude removal).
89. See infra nn. 147-149, 171-172 and accompanying text.
90. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2000).
91. Id. at § 1446(b).
92. Id.
93. Gableman v. Peoria, Decatur & Evansville Ry., 179 U.S. 335, 337 (1900); Chi., Rock Is. & P. Ry. v.
Martin, 178 U.S. 245, 248 (1900). The Supreme Court has not expressly affirmed this rule in many
years, but, with some necessary exceptions, lower federal courts adhere to it faithfully. See Loftis v.
United Parcel Serv. Inc., 342 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2003); Wright et al., supra n. 46, at § 3731
(describing exceptions). But see Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure vol.
Section 1441(a) is the default rule for removal; it governs removal in the
absence of another, more specific removal provision. Its direct lineage traces back to
1887.94 Not surprisingly, therefore, the issue of a plaintiff's ability to remove a case
based on the defendant's assertion of a counterclaim that lies within federal
jurisdiction was settled long ago. In Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets,95 two Texas
defendants owed a Delaware corporation $5,390.42 on an account.96 Although the
Delaware corporation could have filed the case in federal court,97 it chose to file in
state court.98 The defendants then asserted a $7,200 counterclaim, arising out of the
breach of a "separate and distinct" contract, against the corporation.9 Because the
counterclaim met the diversity and amount-in-controversy requirements, a federal
court would have had jurisdiction had the defendants chosen to file the counterclaim
there.
Faced with the counterclaim, and for reasons that are not clear from the
record, 100 the Delaware corporation removed the entire case to federal court. It
invoked 28 U.S.C. section 71, the predecessor to section 1441.101 Section 71
authorized removal by "the defendant or defendants therein." 10 2
Rejecting the Texas defendants' argument that a counterclaim defendant was
not a "defendant" within the meaning of section 71, the district court denied their
motion to remand. 103 After a trial on the merits, the Delaware corporation prevailed on
its original claim and defeated the counterclaim. 104 The Texas citizens appealed the
14C, § 3731, 192-193 (West Supp. 2007) (suggesting that a possible interpretation of a recent
Supreme Court case might threaten the rule of unanimity).
94. Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 373, § 2, 24 Stat. 552, 553 (1887). In 1911, with some alterations in
language, this statute became § 28 of the Judicial Code, see Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, 36 Stat.
1087, 1094-1095 (1911) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 71 (1940)), and in 1948, with additional
alterations, it migrated to § 1441, see Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, Pub. L. No. 80-773, 62 Stat.
869, 937-938 (1949).
95. 313 U.S. 100 (1941).
96. Sheets v. Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp., 115 F.2d 880, 881 (5th Cir. 1940), aff'd, 313 U.S. 100 (1940).
The defendants were two individuals doing business as an oil company, and the dispute involved
their failure to pay for petroleum products that the plaintiff had sold them. See Br. of Petr. at 3,
Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100 (1941).
97. Diversity of citizenship existed, and the amount in controversy at that time was $3,000. See 28
U.S.C. § 41 (1940).
98. Shamrock Oil, 313 U.S. at 103.
99. Id.; Br. of Petr., supra n. 96, at 4. To be precise, the Texas defendants filed a set-off and
cross-action. Under Texas law, a cross-action was the equivalent of a counterclaim. Sheets, 115
F.2d at 881; Br. of Petr., supra n. 96, at 8.
100. The petitioner's brief in the Supreme Court makes no mention of the tactical reason it now preferred
a federal court to hear the case, given its prior tactical decision to sue in state court. The brief
mentions that, on the application of the respondents, the case had been transferred to a state court in
a different county than the county in which it had been filed, and the respondents filed their
counterclaim after the transfer. Br. of Petr., supra n. 96, at 3. A fair inference is that the Delaware
corporation preferred the original state forum to the federal forum, but preferred the federal forum to
the transferee state forum. It used the counterclaim as the excuse to try to avoid its least desirable
forum.
101. Shamrock Oil, 313 U.S. at 103.
102. For the text of 28 U.S.C. § 71 (1940), see Shamrock Oil, 313 U.S. at 104 n. 1.
103. Shamrock Oil, 313 U.S. at 103.
104. Br. of Petr., supra n. 96, at 4; Shamrock Oil, 313 U.S. at 103.
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denial of the remand order.105 The Fifth Circuit held that the corporation had no right
to remove a case simply because a jurisdictionally sufficient counterclaim had been
filed against it.106 The court of appeals' holding relied on three arguments: the
jurisdictional canon that a party cannot remove itself from a forum that it has
voluntarily chosen; 107 prior cases that had denied a counterclaim defendant the right to
remove; 108 and the "defendant or defendants therein" language of section 71.109
The Supreme Court affirmed.110 After observing that the determination of the
corporation's status as a "plaintiff' or "defendant" was to be determined under federal,
not state, law, 1 the Court skipped over the first two arguments raised in the court of
appeals, and "confine[d]" its decision to "the question of statutory construction":1
12
Whether plaintiffs who become counterclaim defendants were "the defendant or
defendants therein" entitled to remove under section 71.113
The Court's answer was unequivocal: The phrase "the defendants or
defendants therein" means what it says, and provides only the original defendant(s) in
the case with the right to remove. 14 Of vital importance in the Court's reasoning was
the history and language of the various iterations of the removal statute.1 5 The first
removal statute, contained in section 12 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, allowed only
"the defendant" to remove a case; 116 in West v. Aurora City, the Supreme Court
interpreted this language not to permit a plaintiff to remove upon becoming a
counterclaim defendant. 17 In 1867, Congress expanded removal jurisdiction to permit
either a plaintiff or a defendant to remove a case if the removing party could show
prejudice or local influence, but in other circumstances left intact the Judiciary Act's
requirement that only a defendant could remove. 118 Then, in 1875, Congress "greatly
105. Shamrock Oil, 313 U.S. at 103.
106. Sheets, 115 F.2d at 884.
107. Id. at 882.
108. Id. at 882-884. The Fifth Circuit thought that "the weight of authority" was against allowing
removal by a counterclaim defendant, id. at 882, although in the Supreme Court the corporation
claimed that twenty-one of twenty-five cases had allowed removal, see Shamrock Oil, 313 U.S. at
101; Br. of Petr., supra n. 96, at 11-14.
109. See Sheets, 115 F.2d at 881, 884.
110. Shamrock Oil, 313 U.S. at 104.
111. Id. ("[A]t the outset it is to be noted that decision turns on the meaning of the removal statute and
not upon the characterization of the suit or the parties to it by state statutes or decisions.").
112. Id.
113. Id. at 104-105.
114. Id. at 105-109.
115. Id. at 105-108.
116. Jud. Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 12, 1 Stat. 73, 79 (1845); see Shamrock Oil, 313 U.S. at 105-106.
117. 73 U.S. 139 (1867). West also denied removal on an alternate holding dealing with a defect in the
removal process, id. at 142, but its principal focus was on the language of the removal statute. In
reaching this interpretation of the statute, the Court's principal argument was that a plaintiff that
voluntarily invoked the jurisdiction of a court should not be allowed to remove - precisely the
argument that the court of appeals had raised in Shamrock Oil. See supra n. 107 and accompanying
text.
118. Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 196, 14 Stat. 558, 559 (1868) (in a case otherwise meeting the diversity
requirements, permitting removal by a non-citizen of the forum state, "whether he be plaintiff or
defendant," if the non-citizen alleges by affidavit that "he has reason to and does believe that, from
prejudice or local influence, he will not be able to obtain justice in such State court"); see Shamrock
Oil, 313 U.S. at 105.
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liberalized"'1 9 removal practice by allowing "either party" to remove a case otherwise
within federal jurisdiction.120 Within twelve years, however, Congress had relented,
replacing the "either party" language of the 1875 Act with "the defendant or
defendants therein" language that eventually migrated into section 71.121
The Supreme Court thought that the return in the 1887 statute to the word
"defendant" was critical:
We think these alterations in the statute are of controlling significance
as indicating the Congressional purpose to narrow the federal
jurisdiction on removal by reviving in substance the provisions of
[section] 12 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 as construed in West v.
Aurora City... If, in reenacting in substance the pertinent provisions
of [section] 12 of the Judiciary Act, Congress intended to restrict the
operation of those provisions or to reject the construction which this
Court had placed upon them, by saving the right of a plaintiff, in any
case or to any extent, to remove the cause upon the filing of a
counterclaim praying an affirmative judgment against him, we can
hardly suppose that it would have failed to use some appropriate
language to express that intention. 122
In its final paragraph, Shamrock Oil bolstered its interpretation of section 71
with a policy argument: the desirability of "strict construction" of "acts of Congress
regulating the jurisdiction of the federal courts.' 23 "Due regard for the rightful
independence of state governments," the Court noted, requires the federal courts to
"scrupulously confine their own jurisdiction to the precise limits which the statute has
defined."124
The language of section 71 changed somewhat when it was re-codified as
section 1441 in 1948; in particular, the phrase "the defendant or defendants therein"
became "the defendant or the defendants."1 25 No one has thought that this slight
alteration should change the default rule announced in West v. City of Aurora and
re-affirmed in Shamrock Oil: Only original defendants, and not counterclaim
defendants, can remove a case to federal court.1 26 Therefore, when Congress has
119. Shamrock Oil, 313 U.S. at 106.
120. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 2, 18 Stat. 470, 471 (1875); see id. (also permitting removal, in a
case "wholly between citizens of different States, and which can be fully determined as between
them," by "either one or more of the plaintiffs or defendants actually interested in such
controversy"); id. (stating the removal procedures by which "either party, or any one or more of the
plaintiffs or defendants entitled to remove" could do so). This jurisdictionally generous statute is
best known for also granting, for the first time in more seventy years, federal-question jurisdiction to
the federal district courts, thus forming the basis for the present 28 U.S.C. § 1331. See Act of Mar.
3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470, 470 (1875).
121. Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 373, § 2, 24 Stat. 552, 553 (1887). On the subsequent history of the 1887
Act, see supra n. 94.
122. Shamrock Oil, 313 U.S. at 107.
123. Id. at 108.
124. Id. at 109 (quoting Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 270 (1934) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
125. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, Pub. L. No. 80-773, 62 Stat. 869, 937-938 (1949).
126. See Wright et al., supra n. 46, at § 3731, 251-253 & nn. 2-3 (collecting cases); id., at 255 & nn. 5-7
(describing a few possible exceptions, not involving counterclaims, in which a person other than an
original defendant might be able to remove).
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wished to provide parties other than defendants with a right of removal, it has used
tailored language to accomplish that result.127
Shamrock Oil did not involve a counterclaim class action, so it is possible to
argue that this procedural context requires a different conclusion. In Shamrock Oil, the
plaintiff asserted claims against the defendants, and only those defendants asserted a
counterclaim against the plaintiff. Nothing in the party structure changed. With a
counterclaim class action, however, new parties are added to the case. These new
parties - the class members - face no claims from the original plaintiff. They are
only plaintiffs; with respect to their claims, the defendant is only a defendant. Perhaps
a financial institution facing such new claims should be seen as a "defendant" entitled
to remove the case to federal court under section 1441(a).
For a number of reasons, however, this argument is unlikely to succeed. The
first, and sufficient, difficulty is one of the other limitations in section 1441(a): the
requirement that a case can be removed only when "the district courts of the United
States have original jurisdiction" over the action. One of the bedrock principles of
federal jurisdiction is the "well-pleaded-complaint rule": Federal jurisdiction is
determined by looking only at the well-pleaded complaint, not at subsequent
pleadings. 128 Counterclaims are not part of the well-pleaded complaint, and cannot be
considered in determining jurisdiction. 129
The "well-pleaded complaint" rule is typically invoked in the context of
federal-question jurisdiction, although the Supreme Court has recently recited it in the
127. See e.g. 28 U.S.C. § 1452 (2000) (allowing "[a] party" to remove certain cases within the federal
courts' bankruptcy jurisdiction); 25 U.S.C. § 487(d) (2000) (requiring joinder of the United States
as an indispensable party and giving it a right of removal in cases involving certain tribal lands); 12
U.S.C. § 1789 (2000) (providing National Credit Union Administration Board with a right of
removal without regard to whether the Board was an original defendant); 12 U.S.C. § 1819(b)(2)(B)
(2000) (granting Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation the same broad right of removal when a
case "is filed against the Corporation or the Corporation is substituted as a party"). Cf. FDIC v.
Otero, 598 F.2d 627 (1st Cir. 1978) (allowing removal based on counterclaim asserted against the
FDIC).
A statute of particular interest is § 337(c) of the Tariff Act of 1930. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c)
(2000). Under § 337, the United States International Trade Commission is authorized to investigate
certain unfair importing practices. Section 337(c) allows the target of such an investigation to file a
counterclaim against the Commission, and then provides: "Immediately after a counterclaim is
received by the Commission, the respondent raising such counterclaim shall file a notice of removal
with a United States district court" having venue over the proceeding. Although arising in the
administrative-law context, § 337(c) shows that Congress is capable of using language to effect the
removal of counterclaims when it so desires. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(f) (2000) (describing
post-removal procedures in a claim removed under § 337(c)).
128. The seminal case is Gold-Washing & Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U.S. 199 (1877). With the exception
of state-law claims completely preempted by federal law, the Supreme Court has adhered to the rule
ever since. See Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908); Franchise Tax Bd. of
Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 10 (1983) ("For better or worse,
under the present statutory scheme as it has existed since 1887, a defendant may not remove a case
to federal court unless the plaintiff s complaint establishes that the case 'arises under' federal law.");
Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (2004).
129. Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys. Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 831-832 (2002) ("[A]
counterclaim - which appears as part of the defendant's answer, not as part of the plaintiff's
complaint - cannot serve as the basis for 'arising under' jurisdiction... [W]e decline to transform
the longstanding well-pleaded-complaint rule into the 'well-pleaded-complaint-or-counterclaim
rule.").
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diversity context as well. 130 In a diversity case, the rule operates somewhat differently:
Whether the case is filed in federal court or removed there, what must appear on the
face of the plaintiffs well-pleaded complaint is complete diversity between opposing
sides and the requisite amount in controversy.131 One difference between a case filed
originally in federal court and one removed there is the date on which the requisite
diversity and amount in controversy must appear in the complaint. For a case filed in
federal court, the date is the date on which the complaint is filed. When the original
claims in the complaint do not establish complete diversity and the amount in
controversy, subsequent events cannot invest the court with jurisdiction. As the
Supreme Court has recently noted, "[i]t has long been the case that 'the jurisdiction of
the court depends upon the state of things at the time of the action brought.' This
time-of-filing rule ... measures all challenges to subject-matter jurisdiction premised
upon diversity of citizenship against the state of facts that existed at the time of
filing-whether the challenge be brought shortly after filing, after the trial, or even for
the first time on appeal." 132 Indeed, in the specific context of ancillary jurisdiction,
which includes federal jurisdiction over compulsory counterclaims, the Court has
recently stated that "'[a]ncillary jurisdiction may extend to claims having a factual and
logical dependence on 'the primary lawsuit,' ... but that primary lawsuit must contain
an independent basis for federal jurisdiction. ' 13 3 Were it otherwise, a plaintiff, such as
130. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 559 (2005) ("When the
well-pleaded complaint contains at least one claim that satisfies the amount-in-controversy
requirement, and there are no other relevant jurisdictional defects, the district court, beyond all
question, has original jurisdiction over that claim.").
131. See St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 289 (1938) ("[I1f, from the face of
the pleadings, it is apparent, to a legal certainty, that the plaintiff cannot recover the amount claimed
or if, from the proofs, the court is satisfied to a like certainty that the plaintiff never was entitled to
recover that amount, and that his claim was therefore colorable for the purpose of conferring
jurisdiction, the suit will be dismissed."); Horton v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 367 U.S. 348, 353 (1961)
("The general federal rule has long been to decide what the amount in controversy is from the
complaint itself, unless it appears or is in some way shown that the amount stated in the complaint is
not claimed 'in good faith.' "). In determining whether a complaint is well-pleaded, a federal court
retains a limited power to realign the parties. See infra Part III.B. It can also look beyond parties
that are fraudulently joined, see 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (2000); Crockett v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
436 F.3d 529 (5th Cir. 2006), and must consider indispensable parties that were not joined, see Fed.
R. Civ. P. 19(b); Carnero v. Bos. Sci. Corp., 433 F.3d 1 (lst Cir. 2006).
See Freeport-McMoRan, Inc. v. K N Energy Inc., 498 U.S. 426, 428 (1991) (describing
the "the well established rule that diversity of citizenship is assessed at the time the action is filed").
For a removed case, the requirements of diversity must exist both on the date on which the case is
filed in state court and the date on which the case is removed - although an exception to the former
requirement exists when a party's departure from the case creates the diversity that the initial
complaint filed in state court lacked. See Wright et al., supra n. 85, at § 3723, 573-575. See also
Caterpillar, Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61 (1996) (holding that federal jurisdiction existed when the
district court erroneously ruled that complete diversity existed at time of removal, and defect in
jurisdiction had been cured by the dismissal of the non-diverse party before the court entered
judgment); Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group, Inc., 541 U.S. 567 (2004) (refusing to extend
Caterpillar to a situation in which the post-filing withdrawal of partner from the partnership cured
the lack of complete diversity).
132. Grupo Dataflux, 541 U.S. at 570-571 (quoting Mollan v. Torrance, 22 U.S. 537, 539 (1824)).
133. Peacock v. Thomas, 516 U.S. 349, 355 (1996) (quoting Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437
U.S. 365, 377 (1978)); see also Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546 (2005)
(requiring that one original claim must meet the amount-in-controversy requirement before a court
can assert supplemental jurisdiction over the claims of other plaintiffs that do not meet the
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a financial institution, could obtain federal jurisdiction over a claim lacking the
requisite amount in controversy simply by alleging that the consumer will file a
counterclaim class action against it.
Even before the Court's recent reassertions of traditional jurisdiction
principles made the contrary argument untenable, most courts held that a counterclaim
with a jurisdictionally sufficient amount in controversy cannot be added onto a
jurisdictionally insufficient original claim to meet the amount-in-controversy
requirement and thereby justify removal.13 4 This rule is absolutely clear when the
counterclaim is merely a permissive one. 135 When the counterclaim is compulsory, the
cases are mixed, but a strong majority refuses to count the value of the counterclaim
when determining the amount in controversy in a removed case. 136 Because the
requirement). Compulsory counterclaims are quintessential claims over which federal courts have
asserted ancillary jurisdiction. See Owen Equip., 437 U.S. at 377 n. 18; Moore v. N.Y Cotton Exch.,
270 U.S. 593 (1926). Permissive counterclaims lie outside of federal subject-matter jurisdiction
unless they possess an independent basis of jurisdiction over them. See Wright et al., supra n. 52, at
§ 1422.
134. The issue has rarely arisen. Because of Shamrock Oil, see supra nn. 95-124 and accompanying text,
only original defendant(s) can seek removal. The one situation in which the argument has been
raised has been when a diverse defendant who is sued in state court on a jurisdictionally insufficient
claim wishes to litigate the case in federal court, and removes the case after filing a counterclaim
that meets the amount-in-controversy requirement. See Wright et al., supra n. 85, at § 3706,
214-215.
135. Wright et al., supra n. 85, at § 3706, 215 & n. 42.
136. Id. at § 3706, 215-217 & n. 43 (collecting cases and critiquing the rule); compare Spectacor Mgmt.
Group v. Brown, 131 F.3d 120, 125-126 (3rd Cir. 1997) (holding that the value of a compulsory
counterclaim can be added to the value of the original claim when the case is originally filed in
federal court and the defendant chooses to assert the counterclaim rather than move to dismiss for
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, but distinguishing contrary holding rendered in removed cases
because Shamrock Oil's strict construction of the removal statutes required that "inclusion of
counterclaims should not be permitted in the removal context"), and Swallow & Assoc. v. Henry
Molded Prods. Inc., 794 F. Supp. 660 (E.D. Mich.1992) (counting amount requested in a
compulsory counterclaim toward the statutory amount in controversy), with Kaplan v. Computer
Sci. Corp., 148 F. Supp. 2d 318, 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (noting Shamrock Oil's policy of strict
construction and holding that "it is inappropriate in a removed case to consider the amount of
Defendant's counterclaim in assessing the amount in controversy for jurisdictional purposes"), and
FLEXcon Co. v. Ramirez Com. Arts, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 2d 185, 187 (D. Mass. 2002) (also noting
Shamrock Oil's policy of strict construction and "[t]he growing weight of authority . . that the
amount in controversy requirement cannot be satisfied by considering a defendant's counterclaim").
The one fly in this ointment is the Supreme Court's decision in Horton v. Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co., 367 U.S. 348 (1961). Horton involved a workers' compensation proceeding in which an
employee sought $14,035 from his employer and its workers' compensation carrier for a workplace
injury. The Texas Industrial Accident Board, an administrative agency, awarded the worker $1,050.
At the time, the requisite amount in controversy for federal jurisdiction was $10,000. The insurer
nonetheless filed suit in federal court to set aside the $1,050 award, and the employee filed a
counterclaim for the full $14,035; the employee also filed suit in state court for that amount. After
reciting the usual mantra that the amount in controversy is determined by looking at the plaintiff's
complaint, see id. at 353, Horton held that the amount-in-controversy requirement was nonetheless
satisfied. Horton's reasoning was opaque; the Court argued that, because the trial of the Accident
Board's award was de novo to the court, and because the employee insisted throughout that he was
due $14,035, "[iut would contradict the whole record as well as the allegations of the complaint to
say that this dispute involves only $1,050. The claim before the Board was $14,035; the state court
suit of petitioner asked that much; the conditional counterclaim in the federal court claims the same
amount." Id. at 353-354. As one set of commentators has observed, Horton is a "surprising
decision"; "it is difficult to the point of impossibility to state the principle for which the Horton
decision stands." Wright et al., supra n. 85, at § 3706, 218, 220. One construction of the decision is
that the value of a compulsory counterclaim should be considered in figuring the amount in
financial institution's original claim does not meet the amount-in-controversy
requirement, 137 the case is not one "of which the district courts of the United States
have original jurisdiction" under section 1441(a). Thus, even without the rule in
Shamrock Oil, a plaintiff financial institution could not remove a case whose original
claim contained a jurisdictionally insufficient amount in controversy.
Second, any argument seeking to avoid the rule in Shamrock Oil for
counterclaim class actions runs afoul of a central rationale underlying the "defendant
only" interpretation of what is now section 1441(a). In West v. Aurora City, the first
case to uphold "defendant only" removal, the Supreme Court found that a right of
removal should not be "given" to "an original plaintiff in a State court who, by
resorting to that jurisdiction, has become liable under the State laws to a
cross-action."1 38 As Chief Justice Chase noted, the plaintiffs in West had "voluntarily
resorted, as plaintiffs," to state court. As a result, "[t]hey were bound to know of what
rights the defendants to their suit might avail themselves under the code. Submitting
themselves to the jurisdiction they submitted themselves to it in its whole extent. The
filing of the new paragraphs, therefore, could not make them defendants to a suit.' 39
So too here. Assuming that state law authorizes counterclaim class actions,"4° a
financial institution must understand that being subjected to such a counterclaim is one
of the risks of proceeding in state court; and the logic of West v. Aurora City does not
allow it to escape state court when that risk materializes.
Third, allowing removal of a counterclaim class action because the financial
institution is only a defendant with respect to most of the class's claims ignores the
fact that, at least with respect to the counterclaims asserted by the original consumer,
the financial institution is in the "plaintiff-counterclaim defendant" posture that West
and Shamrock Oil regarded as insufficient to justify removal. 141 Removal would
controversy. Id. at 220. It is also possible to see the case as a sui generis part of the "skirmish in the
continuing battle" between Texas employees and insurance carriers involving the peculiar Texas
workers' compensation scheme. Id. at 224. In my judgment, however, the case is best explained by
principles of res judicata; if the carrier succeeded in setting aside the Board's $1,050 award, it might
also (depending on the grounds the federal court used to decide the case) be able to use the
necessary factual findings in the judgment as direct estoppel against the employee in the $14,035
case in state court. Thus, Horton is a rare case in which the legal value of the judgment to the
plaintiff ($14,035) was greater than the face value of the complaint ($1,050) - and that fact was
true regardless of whether the employee filed a federal counterclaim. In any event, Horton is
distinguishable because it involved a case filed originally in federal court; courts in removed cases
are more hostile to the inclusion of the value of a compulsory counterclaim in calculating the
amount in controversy.
137. See supra n. 26 and accompanying text.
138. 73 U.S. 139, 142 (1868).
139. Id. Although Shamrock Oil did not rely on the voluntariness argument, it did rely on West, which
relied principally on this rationale. See supra n. 122 and accompanying text; see also supra n. 107
and accompanying text (noting the reliance of the court of appeals in Shamrock Oil on this
rationale).
140. On this issue, see supra nn. 60-80 and accompanying text.
141. One of the arguments asserted by the financial institution in CitiFinancial was the "separate and
distinct" nature of the original claim against the consumer and the counterclaim class action against
it. CitiFinancial, 2007 WL 1655225 at *2. But that argument echoes the argument rejected in
Shamrock Oil, 313 U.S. 100, in which the Delaware corporation also argued that the counterclaim
against it was, under Texas law, "separate and distinct." See supra n. 99 and accompanying text.
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therefore bring into federal court at least one claim that is not ordinarily removable.
But this approach flies in the face of West and Shamrock Oil. Alternatively, the
financial institution might seek to chop up the case and remove only the claims of
class members other than the claim of the original consumer-defendant. The latter
approach runs afoul of section 1441(a)'s requirement that the entire case, and not just
claims within the case, be removed; nor is it evident where the authority to remove
only some claims might come from. 142 Regardless of whether it is facing one
counterclaim or one thousand, the financial institution is in the same procedural
posture - the plaintiff on an original claim and the defendant on a counterclaim - as
other counterclaim defendants who cannot remove.
Finally, the "strict constructionist" argument from Shamrock Oil argues
against too much jurisdictional creativity in the context of counterclaim class
actions. 143 Indeed, recent Supreme Court cases have demonstrated the importance of
paying close attention to the text of the relevant removal provision rather than to
policy arguments for desirable outcomes. 144 A reading of the phrase "the defendant or
the defendants" that is broad enough to sweep a state-law counterclaim class action
into federal court would limit state-court authority to determine state-law claims, in
contravention of desire articulated in Shamrock Oil to allow state courts to exercise
independent authority over such claims to the fullest extent consistent with the
language of removal statutes.
Unsurprisingly, therefore, the few federal courts to consider the issue have not
bent the rule of Shamrock Oil to the emergence of counterclaim class actions.145
Indeed, the conclusion that section 1441 does not authorize the removal of
counterclaim class actions results from an uncomplicated, almost mundane, exercise in
legal reasoning. The combination of a clear text ("the defendant or the defendants"),
an on-point Supreme Court decision (Shamrock Oil), a bedrock jurisdictional canon
(the rule that the court's jurisdiction must appear on the face of the complaint), and a
sensible interpretive policy (strict construction in order to allow state courts the
142. Cf 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (2000) (allowing removal, in federal-question but not diversity cases, of "a
separate and independent claim or cause of action").
143. For a recent case reiterating the need to construe removal statutes strictly, see Syngenta Crop
Protec., Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28 (2002).
144. See e.g. Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2411, 2420 (2007) (interpreting 28
U.S.C. § 1447(c); noting that "[wie will not ignore a clear jurisdictional statute in reliance upon
supposition of what Congress really wanted"); Osborn v. Haley,127 S. Ct. 881 (2007) (interpreting
28 U.S.C. § 2679(d) according to its plain terms); Syngenta, 537 U.S. 28 (refusing to permit
removal under the All Writs Act despite threat posed by state-court action to a federal judgment).
145. Palisades Collections LLC v. Shorts, 2008 WL 163677 (N.D. W. Va. Jan. 16, 2008); ); Ford Motor
Credit Co. v. Jones, 2007 WL 2236616 (N.D. Ohio July 31, 2007); CitiFinancial, Inc. v. Lightner,
2007 WL 1655225 (N.D. W. Va. June 6, 2007); see Unifund CCR Partners v. Wallis, 2006 WL
908755 (D.S.C. Apr. 7, 2006) (holding that Shamrock Oil barred removal of a counterclaim class
action, but not clarifying whether its holding was an interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2000) or
28 U.S.C.§ 1453(b) (2000)); Bush v. Cheaptickets, Inc., 425 F.3d 683, 686 (9th Cir. 2005) (as
support for an argument on a different issue, citing Shamrock Oil for the proposition that "[tihe
removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441, is quite clear that only a 'defendant' may remove the action to
federal court"). Cf. Progressive W. Ins. Co. v. Preciado, 479 F.3d 1014, 1018 (9th Cir. 2007)
(holding Shamrock Oil applicable to removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b)).
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greatest authority to decide cases brought under state law) is too much to overcome.
But the conclusion is nonetheless important, for the non-removability of counterclaim
class actions under section 1441 serves as the baseline for the more complicated
removal problems posed by section 1453(b), the removal provision created by CAFA.
2. Removal Under 28 U.S.C. §1453(b)
In addition to granting original federal jurisdiction over minimally diverse
class actions with more than $5,000,000 at stake, 146 CAFA also created section
1453(b), which concerns the removal of state-court class actions. Section 1453(b)
provides:
A class action may be removed to a district court of the United States
in accordance with section 1446 (except that the 1-year limitation
under section 1446(b) shall not apply), without regard to whether any
defendant is a citizen of the State in which the action is brought,
except that such action may be removed by any defendant without the
consent of all defendants.
In one sense, the meaning of this language is evident: Congress wished to
make state-court class actions widely removable. To accomplish this end, section
1453(b) overrides several of the ordinary barriers to removal: the limit in section
1441(b) that, in a diversity case, a defendant cannot remove a case from its home
forum; 147 the limit in section 1446(b) that a defendant cannot remove a diversity case
once it has been pending in state court for more than one year; 148 and the gloss placed
on section 1446(b) that all defendants must consent to removal. 149
In another sense, however, section 1453(b) is a very perplexing statute.
Counterclaim class actions expose three of its fundamental ambiguities. First, if
section 1453(b) is understood to provide a removal power to federal court,150 the
statute appears to be unconstitutional. 1 ' The reason is simple: To the extent that it
provides a removal power, section 1453(b) allows all class actions to be removed from
state court. Unlike section 1441(a), which limits the right to remove only to those
cases "of which the district courts of the United States have jurisdiction," section
1453(b) says that any "class action may be removed." Section 1453(a) incorporates
the definition of "class action" from section 1332(d)(1),152 which in turn defines a
146. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(d)(2) (West 2006). The statute contains limitations on this jurisdiction. Id. at
§§ 1332(d)(3)-(5) and (d)(9).
147. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2000); see supra n. 90 and accompanying text.
148. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2000); see supra n. 92 and accompanying text.
149. See supra n. 93 and accompanying text.
150. The reason for this caveat will become clear infra nn. 170-181 and accompanying text.
151. Adam Steinman has previously raised the issue of § 1453(b)'s facial unconstitutionality. Adam N.
Steinman, Sausage-Making, Pigs' Ears, and Congressional Expansions of Federal Jurisdiction:
Exxon Mobil v. Allapattah, and its Lessons for the Class Action Fairness Act, 81 WASH. L. REv.
279, 331 (2006). I am indebted to Professor Steinman for discussions about this issue.
152. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1453(a) (West 2006) ("In this section, the term[ ... 'class action' .. shall have the
meaning[ I given such term[ ] under section 1332(d)(1).").
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"class action" to be "any civil action filed under... [a] State statute or rule of judicial
procedure authorizing an action to be brought by 1 or more representative persons as a
class action." '153 Thus, if section 1453(b) provides a removal authority, every case in
state court that seeks class-action status is removable to federal court - regardless of
whether the case lies within the jurisdiction of the federal courts. 154 Since Marbury v.
Madison,1 55 however, it has been understood that federal courts are courts of limited
jurisdiction, and Congressional efforts to supply federal courts with more jurisdiction
than the Constitution permits are unconstitutional.
The second perplexity of section 1453(b) is its failure to assign the removal
power to any particular parties. Section 1453(b) uses the passive voice ("A class
action may be removed"), never stating which parties can remove a state-court class
action. The use of the word "defendant" twice and "defendants" once, as well as the
final clause ("that such action may be removed by any defendant") prove that
defendants are parties who can remove under section 1453(b), but the text does not
expressly state that they are the only parties able to do so.
Still assuming that section 1453(b) provides a removal power, the third
curious feature of the statute is its failure to provide a venue provision indicating the
court to which a class action should be removed. Such a venue provision is de rigeur
in statutes providing a removal power.156 It is passing strange for Congress not to have
included such a provision in section 1453(b).
Because the issue of section 1453(b)'s constitutionality determines, or at least
frames, the question about whether parties are entitled to remove a class action from
state court, I begin with that issue. As I demonstrate, however, it is not ultimately
necessary to resolve the issue of section 1453(b)'s constitutionality.15 7 Whether
section 1453(b) is or is not constitutional, the conclusion is the same: A counterclaim
defendant cannot remove a counterclaim class action.
153. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(d)(1)(B) (West 2006) ("[T]he term "class action" means any civil action filed
under rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or similar State statute or rule of judicial
procedure authorizing an action to be brought by 1 or more representative persons as a class
action.").
154. In particular, § 1453(b) appears to allows removal of a state-court class action in which no federal
question is alleged, and no minimal diversity exists between the class and the people opposing the
class.
155. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
156. For instance, § 1441 lays venue over an action removed under its terms in "the district and division
embracing the place where such action is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2000); see also id. at
§ 1442 (same); id. at § 1443 (same). Section 1453(b) allows a state-court class action case to be
removed "in accordance with section 1446." 28 U.S.C.A. § 1453(b) (West 2006). Section 1446(a)
in turn provides that "a defendant or defendants desiring to remove" a case must file a notice of
removal "in the district court of the United States for the district and division within which such
action is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) (2000). But § 1446(a) states a rule for filing a petition, not
a rule of venue. Thus, § 1453(b)'s reference to § 1446 would not seem to establish a rule of venue.
157. See infra nf. 170-181 and accompanying text (suggesting that the best reading of § 1453(b) renders
it constitutional).
a. The Constitutionality of §1453(b)
The argument for the unconstitutionality of section 1453(b) is a facial one:158
On its face, the statute gives the federal courts subject-matter jurisdiction that they do
not, under Article III, possess. If section 1453(b) in fact does so, then it cannot serve
as a legitimate basis for the removal of a class action, including a counterclaim class
action. Therefore, if a counterclaim defendant wishes to remove counterclaim class
action, it must find a source of power other than section 1453(b) to justify removal.
The only other generally applicable removal power is 28 U.S.C. section 1441(a), but as
we have seen, section 1441(a) does not permit the removal of counterclaim class
actions. 159 Therefore, unless a counterclaim defendant can point to a specific removal
power other that section 1441(a) under which the removal of a counterclaim is
permitted, the unconstitutionality of section 1453(b) means that counterclaim class
actions are not removable to federal court.
A number of interpretive strategies, however, might save section 1453(b) in
some or all of its applications. Loosely, the strategies can be grouped into two
categories: an approach that imports into section 1453(b) the requirement that the
federal court have subject-matter jurisdiction over a removed class action, and an
approach that reads section 1453(b) as a procedural statute defining the terms of
removal rather than as a statute granting a power of removal. 160 Both interpretations
lead to the same conclusion - that a counterclaim defendant cannot remove a
counterclaim class action.
i. As-Applied Constitutionality
Start with the first strategy: saving section 1453(b) from a claim of facial
unconstitutionality by arguing that the statute is constitutional as applied to those class
actions (likely the vast majority) over which federal courts have subject-matter
jurisdiction. This approach thus imports the basic requirement of section 1441(a) -
that a civil action is removable only when the district courts have subject-matter
jurisdiction over the removed action -into section 1453(b); in effect, section 1453(b)
158. For a useful analysis of facial as opposed to as-applied challenges to the constitutionality of
legislation, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Commentary, As-Applied and Facial Challenges and
Third-Party Standing, 113 HARv. L. REv. 1321 (2000).
159. See supra Part III.A.l.
160. Professor Steinman also suggests a third approach for finding § 1453(b) constitutional: that CAFA's
new rules concerning coupon settlements, see Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2,
§ 3, 119 Stat. 4, 5-9 (2005) (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1711-1715 (West 2006)), provides a
sufficient substantive hook to justify jurisdiction over all class actions. See Steinman, supra n. 151,
at 331 n. 273; cf Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480 (1983) (holding Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act constitutional because the Act's creation of substantive federal law
justifies the assertion of federal jurisdiction over all claims arising under the Act). Because
counterclaim class actions remain non-removable under any theory of § 1453(b)'s constitutionality,
see infra Part III.A.2.b, I do not need to pursue this alternate argument any further.
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reads (with the glossed language in italics): "A class action of which the district courts
of the United States have jurisdiction may be removed.' ' 61
A number of arguments support the addition of this gloss. The first is the
legislative history of CAFA. Although this history is very limited and needs to be
treated with more than the ordinary caution, 162 scattered passages can be read to
suggest that section 1453(b) creates a removal authority only over those class actions
that fall within the terms of section 1332(d), which is CAFA's grant of original
class-action jurisdiction to the federal courts. 163 Second, a standard canon of statutory
construction is to construe a statute in a way that avoids a constitutional question;
interpreting section 1453(b) narrowly to allow removal only of jurisdictionally sound
161. There are a couple of variants of this idea. One is that removal of a state-court class action is
authorized whenever a federal court has subject-matter jurisdiction over the class action; the other is
that removal is appropriate only if the federal court has subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to
CAFA's jurisdictional grant, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(d) (West 2006). See Steinman, supra n. 151, at
321-322. Because there are limited circumstances in which the traditional rules of subject-matter
jurisdiction over class actions grant the federal courts jurisdiction to hear cases that CAFA does not,
see id. at 322 (describing the "small, completely diverse class action"), the first variant is slightly
more expansive than the second. The argument for the second variant is that, because § 1453(b)
was passed as a part of CAFA, the scope of the removal jurisdiction should be tied to the scope of
the original jurisdiction CAFA created. Because the additional subject-matter jurisdiction granted
by the first variant is slight, and because the issue of the removability of counterclaim class actions
ends up in the same place under either interpretation, see infra n. 188 and accompanying text, it is
not necessary to choose between the two variants for present purposes.
162. CAFA, which was the second public law enacted in the 109th Congress, was passed on Feb. 17,
2005. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005). The only
significant legislative history accompanying the bill was a Senate Report, which was not completed
until Feb. 28, 2005 - eleven days after CAFA's passage and ten days after President Bush had
signed CAFA into law. Sen. Rpt. 109-14 (Feb. 28, 2005) (reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3);
Statement by President George W. Bush upon Signing S.5, 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. S3). There was also
a brief House Report that accompanied the House Resolution introducing CAFA and setting the
terms of the floor debate, but this Report contained no substantive comments on the legislation. See
H.R. Rpt. 109-7 (Feb. 15, 2005); H.R. Res. 96, 109th Cong. (2005) (enacted). Although legislators
often noted the existence of the removal provision in CAFA or remarked that more class actions
would be removable to federal court under CAFA, see e.g. 151 Cong. Rec. S1003 (daily ed. Feb. 7,
2005) (statement of Sen. Leahy); 151 Cong. Rec. S1087 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 2005) (statement of Sen.
Kennedy); 151 Cong. Rec. S 1150 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 2005) (statement of Sen. Reid); 151 Cong. Rec.
H727 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2005) (statement of Rep. Boucher); id. at H729 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2005)
(statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner), the floor debates in the Senate and House contain no particularly
enlightening references to § 1453.
On the use of legislative history to interpret a statute, compare e.g. Zedner v. United
States, 126 S. Ct. 1976, 1985-1986 (2006) (using legislative purpose and history to interpret a
statute), and Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 600 (2004) (interpreting a
statute in light of its "text, structure, purpose, and history"), with Zedner, 126 S. Ct. 1976, 1991
(Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that "the use of legislative history is illegitimate and ill advised in
the interpretation of any statute - and especially a statute that is clear on its face"), and Exxon
Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568-571 (2005) (critiquing use of legislative
history).
163. See Sen. Rpt. 109-14 at 5 (Feb. 28, 2005) (noting that CAFA "modifies the federal removal statutes
to ensure that qualifying interstate class actions initially brought in state courts may be heard by
federal courts") (emphasis added); id. at 29 ("In order to enable more class actions to be removed to
federal court, [CAFA] would also create three new rules regarding the removal of class actions filed
in state court.") (emphasis added); id. at 48 ("[CAFA] establishes the procedures for removal of
interstate class actions over which the federal court is granted original jurisdiction in new section
1332(d).") (emphasis added).
class actions meets this rule of construction 64 Third, the only time when a party
opposing a class action is likely to remove a case to federal court is when the federal
court has arguable subject-matter jurisdiction; as applied in such cases, section 1453(b)
is constitutional, and it is not clear that a class representative seeking remand has the
ability in such a case to challenge the unconstitutionality of the statute as applied to
others.165 Finally, 28 U.S.C. section 1447(c) provides a federal court with the
authority to remand any removed class action over which it lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction. 166 Because a federal court always has jurisdiction to determine its own
jurisdiction, 167 and because section 1447(c) allows the federal court to immediately
throw back those class actions not fitting within federal jurisdiction, section 1453(b) is
saved from a verdict of unconstitutionality. 168
Although strong arguments can be leveled against this gloss, 169 1 am willing to
assume for now that this reading is a viable way to save the statute. On this reading,
section 1453(b) allows the removal of state-court class actions that otherwise meet the
requirements for federal jurisdiction. The next issue is whether section 1453(b) allows
the removal of counterclaim class actions that, had they been filed as separate actions,
would have met these requirements. Before I come to that issue, however, let me
examine the second interpretation by which section 1453(b) might be saved - an
interpretation that directly demonstrates the non-removability of counterclaim class
actions.
164. Office of Sen. Mark Dayton v. Hanson, 127 S. Ct. 2018, 2021 (2007) (noting "our established
practice of interpreting statutes to avoid constitutional difficulties"); Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S.
371, 380-382 (2005); see Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring);
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932). Cf William K. Kelley, Avoiding Constitutional
Questions as a Three-Branch Problem, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 831 (2001) (critiquing the canon of
avoidance).
165. See Fallon, supra n. 158; Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 395-396 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
166. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (2000) ("If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district
court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.").
167. U.S. v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 628 (2002); U.S. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 330 U.S. 258, 291
(1947).
168. Professor Steinman favors this argument as the means for rendering § 1453(b) constitutional. See
Steinman, supra n. 151, at 331.
169. One argument is that a statute should be read plainly according to its language. See e.g. Lamie v.
U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 536 (2004) ("We should prefer the plain meaning since that approach
respects the words of Congress."). Another is the text of § 1332(d)(10), whose reference to § 1453
is superfluous if § 1453(b) grants jurisdiction only over class actions of which the federal courts
already had jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(d)(10) (West 2006) ("For purposes of this subsection
and section 1453, an unincorporated association shall be deemed to be a citizen of the State where it
has its principal place of business and the State under whose laws it is organized."). Perhaps the
most devastating argument, however, is the text of § 1332(d)(1 1), which states a rule of removal
specifically for state-court mass actions and which limits removal only to those mass actions that
meet the terms of CAFA's original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(d)(1 1)(A) (West 2006) ("For
purposes of this subsection and section 1453, a mass action shall be deemed to be a class action
removable under paragraphs (2) through (10) if it otherwise meets the provisions of those
paragraphs."). In § 1332(d)(1 1)(A), Congress showed that it knew how to use language that limited
removal just to those class actions meeting the jurisdictional requirements of § 1332(d), but it
included no comparable language in § 1453(b).
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ii. Section 1453(b) as a Non-Jurisdictional Provision
The second tack is to treat section 1453(b) not as a rule granting a power of
removal, but rather as a procedural statute whose only purpose is to alter some of the
usual limitations on removal specified in sections 1441(b) and 1446(b). A number of
arguments point to this interpretation as the correct one. First, the text of sections
1332(d) and 1453(b) lend themselves to this interpretation. Section 1332(d)( 1l)(A)
states that "[f]or purposes of this subsection and section 1453, a mass action [meeting
certain requirements] shall be deemed to be a class action removable under
paragraphs (2) through (10)" of section 1332(d) - a clear indication that Congress
thought that section 1332, not section 1453(b), provides the jurisdictional grant for
class actions. 170 Section 1453(b) then says that, with certain specified exceptions, "[a]
class action may be removed to a district court of the United States in accordance with
section 1446.' 17' Section 1446 is entitled "Procedure for removal." It provides no
power of removal; rather, it lays out the method by which a case removable under
another statute is accomplished. The reference in section 1453(b) to section 1446 thus
suggests that the only purpose of section 1453(b) is to incorporate some of the removal
procedures of section 1446 and to make specific changes to other procedures. Thus,
section 1453(b) provides no right of removal; the right to remove a state-court class
action must be found elsewhere. 172
Another argument favoring this reading of section 1453(b) is that it solves a
number of interpretive problems that the as-applied interpretation creates. First, it
avoids making section 1453(b) redundant of section 1441(a), which it would be if the
gloss "of which the district courts of the United States have jurisdiction" is read into
section 1453(b). Second, it explains the curious use of the passive voice in section
1453(b), and the statute's silence concerning who might invoke section 1453(b)'s
power of removal; 73 because the statute itself grants no removal power, there is a
reason to avoid language that might be interpreted as providing a particular party with
a right to remove. Third, it explains the failure of section 1453(b) to include a venue
provision that specifies the federal court to which a class action should be removed. 74
Because section 1453(b) provides no removal power, but only a set of rules modifying
standard removal procedures, the lack of a venue provision makes sense: The venue
170. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(d)(l1)(A) (West 2006) (emphasis added).
171. For these exceptions, see supra nn. 147-149 and accompanying text.
172. Seeing § 1453(b) as a procedural statute, not a removal-power statute, is also consistent with the
structure of the remainder of § 1453. The other principal provision in § 1453 is § 1453(c), which
modifies another of the usual removal procedures: the rule in § 1447(c) that remand orders are not
ordinarily appealable. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)-(d) (2000); cf Thermtron Prods., Inc. v.
Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336 (1976) (allowing a writ of mandamus to lie against a remand order
not based on jurisdictional grounds). In contrast, § 1453(c) makes orders granting or denying
remand appealable within the discretion of the court of appeals. It also states other procedural rules
that govern the appeal. Because § 1453(c) deals with procedural matters, it makes sense to see
§ 1453(b) as similarly dealing with procedural matters.
173. See supra text following n. 155.
174. See supra n. 156 and accompanying text.
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rule is supplied by the statute - section 1441(a) in most cases - that provides the
authority to remove the class action.
Moreover, to the extent that the legislative history is relevant, much of the
history discussing section 1453(b) becomes coherent on a procedure-only reading of
section 1453(b). At one point, the Senate Report states that section 1453 "establishes
the procedures for removal of interstate class actions over which the federal court is
granted original jurisdiction in new section 1332(d)."'175 In the same vein, in
explaining the effect of section 1453(b), the Report states that "[t]he general removal
provisions currently contained in Chapter 89 of Title 28176 would continue to apply to
class actions, except where they are inconsistent with the provisions of the Act." 177 In
particular, noting the venue issue, the Report cites the venue provision of section
1441(a) and states its belief that this venue provision should apply to removed class
actions. 178
Finally, interpreting section 1453(b) as a procedural rather than a
removal-power statute renders the statute constitutioal, thus satisfying the canon of
construction that a statute should be construed to avoid constitutional difficulties
without violating the canon that a statute should be read plainly according to its text.
In the end, the best reading of section 1453(b) is the procedural one: Section
1453(b) grants federal courts no removal power, but only specifies the procedures by
which removal of an otherwise removable state-court class action is accomplished. 179
On that reading, we must look beyond section 1453(b) to find a statute that provides a
removal power over state-court class actions, and then determine under that statute
which parties are entitled to remove the case from state court. In the absence of a
special removal power that might apply in unique circumstances, the only general
removal power applicable to state-court class actions is section 1441(a). As I have
175. Sen. Rpt. 109-14 at 48 (Feb. 28, 2005) (reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 45) (emphasis added);
see also 151 Cong. Rec. H729 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2005) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner) ("The
removal provisions in Section 5 are self-explanatory and attempt to put an end to the type of gaming
engaged in by plaintiffs' lawyers to keep cases in State court. They should be interpreted with this
intent in mind."); id. at H730 (noting that removal might occur under § 1332(d)(6), but not
mentioning removal under § 1453(b) as a possibility). But see infra n. 206 (analyzing a prior
version of CAFA that suggests § 1453(b) provides a removal power).
176. Chapter 89 of Title 28 is entitled "District Courts, Removal of Cases from State Courts." Before the
addition § 1453, it consisted of §§ 1441-1452, which both contained the most common removal
authorities and specified the procedures to be used in removing a case from state court. See 28
U.S.C. ch. 89 (2000).
177. See Sen. Rpt. 109-14 at 48 (Feb. 28, 2005); see also id. at 29 ("In order to enable more class actions
to be removed to federal court, [§ 1453(b)] would also create three new rules regarding the removal
of class actions filed in state court.").
178. See id. at 48.
179. Admittedly, some federal courts that have mentioned the issue have talked about § 1453(b) as if it
granted a removal power. See e.g. Preston v. Tenet Healthsystem Meml. Med. Ctr., 485 F.3d 793,
796 (5th Cir. 2007) (noting that removal occurred "pursuant to ... 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d)(2) &
1453(b)"); Prime Care of N.E. Kan., L.L.C. v. Humana Ins. Co., 447 F.3d 1284, 1285 (10th Cir.
2006); but see Progressive W. Ins. Co. v. Preciado, 479 F.3d 1014, 1015 (9th Cir. 2007) (describing
§ 1332(d) as the source of federal jurisdiction and noting that § 1453(b) only "makes it easier for
litigants to remove class actions to federal district courts"). But none of the cases has considered the
issue in a serious way.
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already shown, section 1441(a) provides no power to remove counterclaim class
actions. 180  Therefore, the consequence of interpreting section 1453(b) as a
removal-procedure, rather than a removal-power, statute is to make counterclaim class
actions non-removable from state court.
181
To recap, if section 1453(b) is either seen as a statute unconstitutionally
granting a removal power or seen as a procedural statute not granting any removal
power, a state-court counterclaim class action can be removed only under an authority
other than section 1453(b). In most cases, the only arguably applicable power will be
section 1441(a). But section 1441(a) does not allow the removal of counterclaim class
actions. On the other hand, if section 1453(b) is seen as constitutional and granting a
removal power, the ability of a counterclaim defendant to remove a state-court
counterclaim class action hinges on whether section 1453(b) can be interpreted to
grant such a power to parties other than the original defendants. As the following
section shows, the text of section 1453(b) does not support this view.
b. The Language of § 1453(b)
On the assumption that section 1453(b) provides a removal power that passes
constitutional muster, a number of reasons suggest that the statute is best construed not
to provide counterclaim defendants with a right to remove counterclaim class actions.
The first reason is the language of the statute itself. Section 1453(b) allows a "class
action" to be removed. A "class action" is defined to be "any civil action filed under
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or similar State statute or rule of
judicial procedure authorizing an action to be brought by 1 or more representative
persons as a class action."1 82 The phrase "civil action" implies that the class action
must be the original case filed in court, not just a counterclaim in that case; thus, the
only class actions removable are those filed as original claims in state court. 183 Adding
weight to this conclusion is section 1453(b)'s use of the word "defendant" twice and
"defendants" once. Granting that the statute's use of these words does not logically
exclude the possibility of removal by plaintiffs, 84 its silence on the matter suggests
180. See supra Part III.A.1.
181. The exception to this statement arises in the context of a case in which a unique removal power
allows someone other that the original defendant to remove the case. For examples of such statutes,
see supra n. 126.
182. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(d)(1)(B) (West 2006); see supra n. 152-153 and accompanying text (detailing
how this definition is incorporated into § 1453(b)).
183. Cf Fed. R. Civ. P. 2 ("There is one form of action - the civil action.").
184. A statute with a comparable ambiguity in terms of which parties might remove, as well as a
comparable purpose to expand federal jurisdiction over class actions, is 15 U.S.C. § 77p(c) (2000).
Section 77p(c), which allows the removal of state-court class actions that involve certain claims of
securities fraud, was enacted as part of the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998,
Pub. L. No. 105-353, § 101, 112 Stat. 3227, 3228 (1998), and was designed to close a loophole in
federal securities-fraud class-action practice that allowed investors to bypass federal restrictions on
securities claims by asserting only state-law securities claims in state-court class actions. See
Lander v. Hartford Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 251 F.3d 101, 107-108 (2d Cir. 2001) (describing the
history of the statute). Using the same passive voice found in § 1453(b), § 77p(c) states that "Lalny
covered class action brought in any State court involving a covered security ... shall be removable
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that such removal was not within Congress's contemplation - for, unlike its specific
mention of removal by defendants ("such action may be removed by any defendant"),
it made no reference whatsoever to removal by plaintiffs. A third piece of linguistic
evidence is the reference in section 1453(b) to section 1446, which describes the
procedures by which "[a] defendant or defendants" wishing to remove a case may do
S0.185 This "defendant or defendants" language mirrors "the defendant or the
defendants" language of section 1441(a) - which, as we have seen, has been
understood since Shamrock Oil to apply only to original defendants, not to
counterclaim defendants. 186 The reference in section 1453(b) to section 1446, and
section 1446(a)'s invocation of the "defendant or defendants" language that Shamrock
Oil imbued with particular meaning, suggests that Shamrock Oil's limitation of
removal authority just to original defendants carries forward to section 1453(b).
Finally, if section 1453(b) provides a removal power, the removing party must still
point to another statute providing the necessary federal subject-matter jurisdiction. In
all or nearly all cases, that grant will be section 1332(d)(2). But section 1332(d)(2)(A)
is very specific: It grants jurisdiction only when "any member of a class of plaintiffs is
a citizen of a State different from any defendant."'1 7 This language strongly suggests
that, in enacting CAFA, Congress contemplated jurisdiction only over plaintiff class
actions, not over counterclaim class actions. 18
to the Federal district court for the district in which the action is pending." This provision does not
indicate which parties can invoke the removal power. I have found no cases discussing whether a
party other than a defendant can do so. Because it is unlikely that a securities class action will arise
by way of a counterclaim, the dearth of authority concerning this ambiguity in § 77p(c) is
unsurprising.
185. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) (2000) provides in full:
A defendant or defendants desiring to remove any civil action or criminal prosecution
from a State court shall file in the district court of the United States for the district and
division within which such action is pending a notice of removal signed pursuant to
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and containing a short and plain
statement of the grounds for removal, together with a copy of all process, pleadings,
and orders served upon such defendant or defendants in such action.
186. 313 U.S. at 107-108; see supra nn. 114-124 and accompanying text.
187. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(d)(2)(A) (West 2006) (emphasis added). Comparable language exists in the
context of foreign states and citizens; § 1332(d)(2)(B) provides jurisdiction when "any member of a
class of plaintiffs is a foreign state or citizen or subject of a foreign state and any defendant is a
citizen of a State," while § 1332(d)(2)(C) provides jurisdiction when "any member of a class of
plaintiffs is a citizen of a State and any defendant is a foreign state or a citizen or subject of a foreign
state." Id. at §§ 1332(d)(2)(B), (C) (emphasis added).
188. At this point, the ambiguity about whether § 1453(b) allows removal only of those class actions for
which CAFA provides original jurisdiction in § 1332(d) or of any class action (including those that
met the traditional jurisdictional requirements) comes into play. See supra n. 161 and
accompanying text. If the former, then the "class of plaintiffs" language becomes very hard for a
counterclaim defendant to overcome; it can do so only by convincing a court that a plaintiff facing a
counterclaim is a "defendant," and a defendant asserting a counterclaim is a "plaintiff' within the
meaning of § 1332(d)(2). If the latter interpretation of § 1453(b) is true, then the "class of
plaintiffs" language would not be relevant to the removal of those class actions that met the
pre-CAFA requirements for federal jurisdiction. See supra n. 28 (describing pre-CAFA
jurisdictional requirements). Even here, the first three textual arguments in this paragraph would
still apply to such class actions.
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Standing alone, none of these textual arguments is completely airtight, but the
sum total of all the pieces of textual evidence is compelling. If section 1453(b) grants
any removal power at all, it grants that power only to the original defendants in the
case. Never does the statute use "either party" language comparable to the removal
statute in effect between 1875 and 1887.189 Its only concern is removal by a
"defendant" or "defendants."
Three canons of statutory construction also support this conclusion. The first
is the canon that Congress is aware of prior judicial interpretations of statutory
language when it uses or incorporates that same language in later statutes. As the
Court has stated:
Congress is presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial
interpretation of a statute and to adopt that interpretation when it
re-enacts a statute without change. So too, where, as here, Congress
adopts a new law incorporating sections of a prior law, Congress
normally can be presumed to have had knowledge of the interpretation
given to the incorporated law, at least insofar as it affects the new
statute. 190
A second canon is expressio unius est exclusio alterius - loosely, "the
expression of one thing excludes another." 191 A third canon of statutory construction
- derived from Shamrock Oil'92 and applied by courts in the precise context of
interpreting section 1453(b) 193 - is to construe removal statutes strictly in order to
preserve the role of state courts in deciding questions of state law. In combination,
these three canons suggest that, in mentioning only "defendant" and "defendants" in
section 1453(b), Congress knew the rule from Shamrock Oil that these words did not,
in the removal context, include counterclaim defendants; that in expressly discussing
only the removal by a "defendant" or "defendants," Congress excluded the possibility
of removal by other parties; and that this limitation on removal is justified because it
assures to states a greater authority to adjudicate claims that arise under state law.
189. See supra nn. 120-121 and accompanying text.
190. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580-581 (1978). See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 645 (1998)
("When administrative and judicial interpretations have settled the meaning of an existing statutory
provision, repetition of the same language in a new statute indicates, as a general matter, the intent
to incorporate its administrative and judicial interpretations as well."); Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874,
921 n. 22 (1994); Cottage Say. Assn. v. Commr., 499 U.S. 554, 562 (1991); Trans World Airlines,
Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985).
191. Leatherman v. Tarrant Co. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993);
see also Barnhardt v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 168-169 (2003) (describing limits of the
canon).
192. 313 U.S. at 108-109; see supra nn. 123-124 and accompanying text.
193. See e.g. Miedema v. Maytag Corp., 450 F.3d 1322, 1328 (1 lth Cir. 2006) ("The rule of construing
removal statutes strictly and resolving doubts in favor of remand, however, is well-established.")
(citing Shamrock Oil); Abrego Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co, 443 F.3d 676, 685 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting
that "[t]his rule of restriction extends to removal jurisdiction, especially insofar as it is based on the
diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts."); Pritchett v. Office Depot, Inc., 420 F.3d 1090,
1094-1095 (10th Cir. 2005) ("It is well-established that statutes conferring jurisdiction upon the
federal courts, and particularly removal statutes, are to be narrowly construed in light of our
constitutional role as limited tribunals.") (citing Shamrock Oil).
In addition, this interpretation of section 1453(b) better comports with three
jurisdictional canons. One is the rule that federal jurisdiction must be premised on the
allegations in the original complaint, not on the allegations in subsequent pleadings.194
Another, invoked by the Supreme Court in West v. Aurora City' 95 and the Fifth Circuit
in Shamrock Oil, 19 6 is that a party that has voluntarily chosen a state forum should not
be allowed to remove from that forum. 197 Third, a distinct "voluntary/involuntary"
rule holds that, if a case is not initially removable, it "must remain in state court unless
a 'voluntary' act of the plaintiff brings about a change that renders the case
removable." 198 In total, these canons lead to a simple conclusion: Because the
financial institution's original complaint invoked only non-removable state-law
claims, the institution cannot use the subsequent counterclaim pleadings of the
consumer to remove the case to federal court. Congress, of course, can overcome
these canons with clear language, 99 but nothing in section 1453(b) approaches the
necessary specificity.
The inability of a counterclaim defendant to remove a class action under
section 1453(b) is also consistent with CAFA's legislative history. As discussed
above, the legislative history that specifically discusses removal is limited, and most
consistent with the view that section 1453(b) provides no removal power.2°0 What can
also be gleaned from the history of the bill that became CAFA is Congress's absolute
silence on the issue of removing counterclaim class actions - the idea seems never to
have been in Congress's contemplation. Instead, the focus of the Senate Report was
on the purported mischief of class actions asserted by plaintiff classes against
defendants in state court. 201 Nowhere in the Report is there even the slightest hint of
any congressional intent to upset the longstanding rule in Shamrock Oil. The same is
true of the floor debates. 202
194. See supra nn. 128-137 and accompanying text.
195. 73 U.S. 139 (1868).
196. Sheets, 115 F.2d 880.
197. See supra nn. 107, 138-139 and accompanying text. Of course, a financial institution's decision to
file a case against a consumer in state court is not voluntary in the sense that the institution had a
choice of state or federal court; by hypothesis, the claim is too small to lie within federal
jurisdiction. See supra n. 26 and accompanying text. But that does not seem to be the sense in
which voluntariness is used, at least in West v. Aurora City, in which it was not clear that the
plaintiff could have filed the case in federal court. See 73 U.S. at 142. Rather, the financial
institution's voluntary decision is the decision to sue; once having made that choice, the institution
must accept the good with the bad in the state forum.
198. Self v. Gen. Motors Corp., 588 F.2d 655, 657 (9th Cir. 1978); see Cal. v. Keating, 986 F.2d 346 (9th
Cir. 1993). In its modem form, this rule derives from Great N. Ry. v. Alexander, 246 U.S. 276
(1918).
199. Keating, 986 F.2d at 348-349.
200. See supra nn. 162, 175-178 and accompanying text.
201. For instance, the Senate Report listed litanies of state-court cases that it used as the poster children
proving the need for federal, rather than state, jurisdiction; it also provided a series of examples
showing how CAFA would work. Not even one of those actual or hypothetical cases was described
as a counterclaim class action; they were all traditional class actions brought by plaintiffs. See Sen.
Rpt. No. 109-14 at 15-20, 24-26, 38-39, 41, 48 (Feb. 28, 2005), (reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3,
15-20, 24-26, 37, 39, 45).
202. In the debates, there were only a few specific references to which parties were capable of removing,
and all of the references support the view that only defendants can remove. 151 Cong. Rec. H732
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The most tantalizing piece of legislative history, however, involves a prior
iteration of CAFA introduced in the previous Congress - the Class Action Fairness
Act of 2003.203 In the version of the section that became section 1453(b), the 2003 bill
permitted removal "by any plaintiff class member who is not a named or representative
class member without the consent of all members of such class."2°4 This provision
was jettisoned in CAFA itself, one of a dozen changes to the 2003 bill designed to win
sufficient support to invoke cloture.205 But its presence in the 2003 version of CAFA
shows that Congress had considered (and had even crafted language to cover) the
possibility of removal by plaintiffs, that Congress had specifically wished to limit the
plaintiffs entitled to remove just to plaintiff class members, and that Congress had not
wished to allow plaintiffs facing a counterclaim class action to remove a case. Of
course, because this language had been stricken before the bill that became CAFA was
introduced, drawing conclusions from this language is a delicate matter, but the
language certainly does nothing to strengthen the hand of anyone arguing that CAFA
allows the removal of counterclaim class actions.206
Facing insuperable textual and interpretive hurdles, some counterclaim
defendants have turned to policy to support their removal efforts, arguing that CAFA's
general policy favoring a federal forum for class actions should carry over to the
(daily ed. Feb. 17, 2005) (statement of Rep. Boucher) (in discussing § 1332(d)(11), noting that
"defendants will be able to remove mass actions to Federal court under the same circumstances in
which they will be able to remove class actions"); id. at H732-733 (statement of Rep.
Sensenbrenner) (noting that "if the plaintiff files an amended complaint in State court that creates
jurisdiction, or if subsequent events create jurisdiction, the defendant can then remove the case to
Federal court"); 151 Cong. Rec. S1231 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen. Feingold)
(introducing an unsuccessful amendment intended to prevent "defendants from removing cases that
should still be in State court"); id. at S1247 (statement of Sen. Reid) (stating that "a defendant
incorporated in a State other than Nevada could remove the case from Nevada State court").
203. S. 1751, 108th Cong. (Oct. 17, 2003).
204. Id. at § 5(a).
205. See Summary of Changes to S. 1751 as Agreed to by Senators Frist, Grassley, Hatch, Kohl, Carper,
Dodd, Landrieu, and Schumer (undated) (reprinted in 151 Cong. Rec. S1078 (daily ed. Feb. 8,
2005)). The Class Action Fairness Act of 2003 had failed by one vote to secure the necessary sixty
votes to end a filibuster. See S. Roll Call Vote No. 403, 108th Cong. (2003) (available at http://
www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll-call-lists/roll call-votescfm.cfm?congress=108&session=l&
vote=00403). The stricken language permitting removal by class plaintiffs remained in the parallel
bill introduced in the House, see Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, H.R. 516, 109th Cong. § 5(a)
(Feb. 2, 2005), but the House instead voted in favor of the Senate version, see H.R. Roll Call 38,
109th Cong. (2005) (available at http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2005/rol037.xml).
206. The deleted language solves one mystery in CAFA - the curious use of a passive voice that fails to
assign to any party a right to remove. See supra text following n. 155; supra n. 173 and
accompanying text. As originally written, before the "removal by plaintiff class member" language
was deleted, the bill made somewhat clearer who could remove: defendants facing a class action
and class plaintiffs. The deleted language might appear to undercut my claim that § 1453(b) is best
understood as creating no removal power. See supra nn. 170-179 and accompanying text. In fact,
the opposite is true. The unenacted House version of § 1453(b) bears little resemblance to the
enacted version. It was designed to override procedural barriers to removability: the requirement in
Shamrock Oil that only defendants could remove, the home-state non-removability limitation of
§ 1441(b), and the Supreme Court's gloss that all defendants needed to join in the removal petition.
Indeed, the unenacted version specifically acknowledged that, in other regards, removal could occur
only "in accordance with this chapter" - including, presumably, the jurisdictional limitation of
§ 1441(a). See H.R. 516, 109th Cong. § 5(a) (Feb. 2, 2005).
specific issue of permitting removal counterclaim class actions .207 In a related context,
however, courts have not allowed CAFA's general policy to override the ordinary
requirement that the removing party bears the burden of proving federal jurisdiction -
even though the legislative history states clearly that CAFA intended to effect such an
override. 20 8  Given the legislative history's silence about the removability of
counterclaim class actions, and its exclusive focus on traditional class actions asserted
by a plaintiff class, counterclaim defendants that seek to create a removal power out of
the general policy of section 1453(b) are making the legislative history do far more
work than it reasonably can. Indeed, in light of the Supreme Court's recent refusal to
bend the language of other removal statutes to the purported requirements of the
"better" policy, 20 9 the attempt to elevate a policy stated at its most abstract level
("favor the federal forum for class actions") over the text of section 1453(b) and the
principles of sound construction is quixotic at best.
Unsurprisingly, therefore, courts have been dismissive of the argument that
counterclaim defendants can remove under section 1453(b). The assessment in
Progressive West was short, blunt, and unforgiving:
Although CAFA does eliminate three significant barriers to
removal for qualifying actions, CAFA does not create an exception to
Shamrock's longstanding rule that a plaintiff/cross-defendant cannot
remove an action to federal court. CAFA's removal provision, section
1453(b), provides that "[a] class action may be removed to a district
court... in accordance with section 1446." Section 1446, in turn, sets
forth the removal procedure for "[a] defendant or defendants desiring
to remove any civil action ... from a State court." The interpretation
of "defendant or defendants" for purposes of federal removal
jurisdiction continues to be controlled by Shamrock, which excludes
plaintiff/cross-defendants from qualifying "defendants."
Nor can we accept Progressive's invitation to read CAFA
liberally as making a sub silentio exception to Shamrock. We have
declined to construe CAFA more broadly than its plain language
indicates. "Faced with statutory silence.., we presume that Congress
207. See Progressive W. Ins. Co. v. Preciano, 479 F.3d 1014, 1017 (9th Cir. 2007); Pet. of CitiFinancial,
supra n. 39, at 7.
208. Compare e.g. Blockbuster, Inc. v. Galeno, 472 F.3d 52 (2d Cir. 2006) (applying the usual rule that a
defendant bears the burden of proving federal jurisdiction on removal), and Abrego Abrego v. Dow
Chem. Co, 443 F.3d 676, 685 (9th Cir. 2006) (also applying the rule that a defendant must prove
jurisdiction on removal), with e.g. Sen. Rpt.109-14 at 42 (Feb. 28, 2005) (reprinted in 2005
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 40) ("If a purported class action is removed pursuant to [CAFA], the named
plaintiff(s) should bear the burden of demonstrating that the removal was improvident (i.e., that the
applicable jurisdictional requirements are not satisfied)."). Cf Evans v. Walter Indus., Inc., 449
F.3d 1159 (11 th Cir. 2006) (imposing burden on removing defendant to prove federal jurisdiction,
but on plaintiffs to prove an exception to jurisdiction that justifies remand). Cases such as
Blockbuster and Abrego Abrego are especially significant not only because they reflect the
unwillingness of courts to abide by legislative history far more pointed than any legislative
statements a financial institution could find to justify the removal of counterclaim class actions, but
also because they demonstrate the unwillingness of federal courts to unsettle well-established rules
governing the removal process without crystalline textual authority to do so.
209. See supra n. 144 and accompanying text.
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is aware of the legal context in which it is legislating." This
presumption is especially appropriate here, where "[t]he legal context
in which the 109th Congress passed CAFA into law features a
longstanding, near-canonical rule" that a state plaintiff forced to
defend on the basis of a cross-complaint is without authority to
remove.
210
Other courts have come to the same conclusion, also in short order.211 One of the
courts even sanctioned counsel for the counterclaim defendant for the frivolity of
attempting removal under CAFA.2
12
Although I do not go so far as to suggest that the argument favoring removal
of a counterclaim class action under-section 1453(b) is frivolous, it is assuredly weak
enough to teeter near that line. The principal problem with the argument - a problem
on which the cases have not even focused so far - is that section 1453(b) is best
construed to provide no removal power to any party, and certainly none to a
counterclaim defendant. 213  But even on the arguable view that section 1453(b)
contains a removal power, there is no warrant in the language, in interpretive
principles, in the legislative history, or in the cases to believe that counterclaim
defendants are among the parties that can remove a class action to federal court.
B. Realigning the Parties as a Means of Making a Class Action
Counterclaim Removable
Perhaps sensing the futility of arguing for a right to remove a counterclaim
class action, some financial institutions have recently begun to employ a little-known
jurisdictional sleight of hand to hold onto the federal forum after removal: They have
requested the federal court to realign the parties, so that the original defendant and the
class of consumers that he or she represents become the plaintiffs, and the financial
institution becomes the defendant. If the maneuver is successful, the counterclaim
class action becomes the principal claim, and the original claim against the consumer
becomes the counterclaim. 214 Once realigned as the defendant, the financial institution
210. 479 F.3d at 1017-1018 (quoting Abrego Abrego, 443 F.3d at 683-684).
211. Palisades Collections LLC v. Shorts, 2008 WL 163677 (N.D. W. Va. Jan. 16, 2008); CitiFinancial,
Inc. v. Lightner, 2007 WL 1655225 (N.D. W. Va. June 6, 2007); Unifund CCR Partners v. Wallis,
2006 WL 908755 (D.S.C. Apr. 7, 2006).
212. Unifund, 2006 WL 908755 at *3 (imposing $500 sanction).
213. See supra nn. 170-179 and accompanying text.
214. There is a significant body of law regarding the ability of a defendant to assert a counterclaim
against an individual class representative or class member. Some courts have refused to permit their
assertion. Compare e.g. Donson Stores, Inc. v. Am. Bakeries Co., 58 F.R.D. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)
(refusing to permit counterclaim against plaintiff class members), with e.g. Natl Super Spuds, Inc. v.
N.Y. Mercantile Exch., 75 F.R.D. 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (permitting counterclaim against class
members), and Johns v. Rozet, 141 F.R.D. 211 (D.D.C. 1992) (permitting counterclaim against class
representative); see also Wright et al., supra n. 52, at § 1404, 25 & n. 19 (noting the split in the
cases); cf. Maddox v. Ky. Fin. Co., 736 F.2d 380 (6th Cir. 1984) (holding that individual
debt-collection counterclaims should be dismissed because they were permissive rather than
compulsory and no independent basis of federal jurisdiction existed to hear them). Other courts
have allowed them; some of these courts have then used the counterclaims' presence as a reason not
to certify the class action. Compare e.g. Heaven v. Trust Co. Bank, 118 F.3d 735 (11th Cir. 1997)
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thus becomes a "defendant" entitled to remove the case under the ordinary principles
of section 1441(a) (and, to the extent that it grants an independent removal power,
section 1453(b)).
Thus far, the courts that have addressed realignment in the counterclaim class
action context have been unimpressed with the argument.21 5 Their skepticism is
justified. The doctrine of realignment is tailored to the requirements of diversity
jurisdiction, in which all plaintiffs must usually be of diverse citizenship from all
defendants. 216 For purposes of determining whether complete diversity exists,
however, party status as a plaintiff or defendant is not determined by the labels that the
parties use in the pleadings; federal courts have the power to determine the issue as a
matter of federal law. 217 Therefore, even if the parties are otherwise designated in the
pleadings, a federal court can realign a plaintiff as a defendant, or a defendant as a
plaintiff. This realignment might result switching a case from complete to incomplete
diversity, thus thwarting federal jurisdiction; or it might result in switching a case from
incomplete to complete diversity, thus creating federal jurisdiction.21 In most cases,
realignment reshuffles some of the parties from one side to another.
In the counterclaim-removal context, however, realignment seeks to flip over
the case entirely, making all the original plaintiffs into defendants and all the original
(affirming the denial of class certification based in part on the presence of individual counterclaims
that would have made the class action unmanageable), with e.g. Roper v. Consurve, Inc., 578 F.2d
1106 (5th Cir. 1978) (reversing the denial of class certification and holding that presence of
potential counterclaims did not make the class unmanageable), aff'd on other grounds sub nom.
Deposit Guardian Natl. Bank, Jackson, Miss. v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326 (1980) and Gilkey v. C.
Clearing Co., 202 F.R.D. 515 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (certifying class despite potential counterclaims).
Apparently, financial institutions making the realignment argument are willing to accept the risk of
dismissal of their original claims in return for the benefits of obtaining the federal forum on the
consumer's class claims and securing the opportunity to argue that the presence of its individual
claims against the class representative should prevent class certification.
215. Palisades Collections LLC v. Shorts, 2008 WL 163677 (N.D. W. Va. Jan. 16, 2008); CitiFinancial,
Inc. v. Lightner, 2007 WL 1655225 (N.D. W. Va. June 6, 2007); Williamsburg Plantation, Inc. v.
Bluegrass Corp., 478 F. Supp. 2d 861, 864 (E.D. Va. 2006) (refusing to realign parties so that
federal-question counterclaim, brought as an opt-in class action, could be used to establish
subject-matter jurisdiction; noting that the presence of a counterclaim class action "is an insufficient
reason for realigning the parties"); Great E. Resort Corp. v. Bluegreen Corp., 2006 WL 331504
(W.D. Va. 2006); see Rodriguez v. Fed. Natl. Mortg. Assn., 268 F. Supp. 2d 87 (D. Mass. 2003)
(refusing to permit removal even after the dismissal of the financial institution's original claim and
the transfer of the consumer's counterclaim class action to the docket of a state court of general
jurisdiction); Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Arndt, 72 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (D. Kan. 1999) (refusing to
permit realignment after plaintiff dismissed its claim in non-class-action case); OPNAD Fund, Inc.
v. Watson, 863 F. Supp. 328 (S.D. Miss. 1994) (refusing to permit realignment in non-class-action
case).
216. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267 (1806). The rule of complete diversity is a statutory gloss;
Article III requires only minimal diversity. St. Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523
(1967).
217. City of Indianapolis v. Chase Nati. Bank of City of N.Y., 314 U.S. 63, 69 (1941) ("Diversity
jurisdiction cannot be conferred upon the federal courts by the parties' own determination of who
are plaintiffs and who defendants. It is our duty, as it is that of the lower federal courts, to look
beyond the pleadings, and arrange the parties according to their sides in the dispute.") (internal
quotation marks omitted).
218. See Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure vol. 13B, § 3607 (2d ed., West
1984).
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defendants into plaintiffs.219 And therein lies its difficulty. Realignment ensures that
adverse parties line up on opposite sides of the sUit.220 In the counterclaim context, the
original claim by the plaintiff against the defendant renders the parties adverse to each
other; the assertion of the counterclaim only heightens their adversity. Because the
requisite adversity exists, there is no reason to realign the plaintiff/counterclaim
defendant as the "true" defendant.
This sensible conclusion has one small crack in its armor, and it has been this
crack that some counterclaim defendants have tried to widen into a road big enough to
drive their cases into federal court. The seminal modem case on realignment, City of
Indianapolis v. Chase National Bank of City of New York, 221 can be read in two ways.
The narrower, and more sensible reading, is to permit realignment only to ensure that
adverse parties end up on opposing sides in the case. 222 But City of Indianapolis can
also be read more broadly - to allow realignment based on the "principal purpose of
the dispute" or the "primary and controlling matter in dispute."223 Seizing on these
ambiguous phrases, some financial institutions have argued that, once the counterclaim
asserts class-action allegations, the counterclaim dwarfs the original claim, so that the
"principal purpose of the dispute" or "primary and controlling matter in dispute" now
becomes the adjudication of the class-action counterclaim. On this broad view, the
court is justified in realigning the parties, making the financial institution into the
defendant and allowing it to remove the case under the removal authority given to
defendants.
But this argument makes a couple of loose phrases in City of Indianapolis do
work for which they were never intended. To begin with, City of Indianapolis did not
involve a counterclaim that the counterclaim defendant tried to flip over to the main
claim. The case involved a mortgagee that held a security interest in certain property
of one of the defendants. The defendant leased the property to a second defendant in
return for a certain guaranteed rate of return. The second defendant honored the lease
for more than twenty years, then transferred its assets, including the property subject to
the lease, to a third defendant. The third defendant denied that the lease was valid, and
refused to honor its terms. Claiming diversity of citizenship and the requisite amount
in controversy, the mortgagee, a citizen of New York, sued all three defendants, who
were all citizens of Indiana, in federal court.224 Although there was a dispute between
219. See Wright et al., supra n. 46, at § 3731 (noting that realignment can occur in the removal context).
220. See Charles Alan Wright et al., supra n. 218, at § 3607 ("The generally accepted test of realignment
is whether the parties with the same 'ultimate interests' in the outcome of the action are on the same
side.").
221. 314 U.S. 63 (1941).
222. Id. at 69 ("To sustain diversity jurisdiction there must exist an 'actual,' 'substantial' controversy
between citizens of different states, all of whom on one side of the controversy are citizens of
different states from all parties on the other side.") (internal citations and some punctuation
omitted).
223. City of Indianapolis v. Chase Nati. Bank of City of New York, 314 U.S. 63, at 69 (1941) ("Whether
the necessary 'collision of interests' exists, it is therefore not to be determined by mechanical rules.
It must be ascertained from 'the principal purpose of the suit' and 'the primary and controlling
matter in dispute'....") (internal citations and some punctuation omitted).
224. Id. at 70-72.
the plaintiff and the first defendant (which was legally obligated to pay the interest on
the bonds that the mortgagee held), the first defendant had no assets other than the
property with which to make the payments, and had every incentive to (and did) assert
throughout the case that the lease was valid. That assertion put the first defendant in
line with the plaintiff, which took also the position that the lease was valid, and in
opposition to the other defendants, which argued that the lease was invalid and not
binding on them.2 5
According to Justice Frankfurter, these "facts leave no room for doubt that on
the merits only one question permeates this litigation: Is the lease whereby [the first
defendant] conveyed all its gas plant property to [the second defendant] valid and
binding upon [the third defendant]? This is the 'primary and controlling matter in
dispute.'- 226 On that controlling issue, the majority in City of Indianapolis held that
the plaintiff and the first defendant were "partners in litigation";227 their unity of
interest made their division into plaintiff and defendant "window-dressing designed to
satisfy the requirements of diversity jurisdiction" 228 and an "illusive artifice[ ].-229
Therefore, the Court realigned the first defendant as a plaintiff. Because that
realignment left citizens of Indiana on both sides of the dispute and defeated the
requirement of complete diversity, the Court held that the federal courts lacked
jurisdiction to decide the dispute.230
Unfortunately, City of Indianapolis used numerous phrases - "actual" and
"substantial controversy," "collision of interests," and "principal purpose of the suit"
- to describe the approach that courts should use in assessing whether realignment is
proper. At the margins, these phrases can lead to different results on the issue of
realignment, and lower courts have sometimes struggled in their efforts to determine
the proper approach.231 Of these varying descriptions, only the "principal purpose"
test provides any refuge to a counterclaim defendant trying to remove a case from state
225. City of Indianapolis, 314 U.S. at 71, 73.
226. Id. at 72.
227. Id. at 74.
228. Id. at 72.
229. Id. at 76.
230. Id. at 74-75. A dissent, joined by four Justices, argued that the original plaintiff's claim against the
first defendant, which defaulted on its obligations when the third defendant repudiated the lease,
amounted to more than $1,000,000, for which it was ultimately held solely responsible when the
district court held that the lease did not bind either of the latter two defendants. Id. at 78-79. On
that issue and others, there was a sufficiently "sharp conflict" to deny realignment. Id. at 81.
Indeed, it is language in the dissent - which sought to characterize the majority's decision as one in
which a "relatively less important" claim is subject to realignment because of a "dominant" claim,
"or because one is more 'actual' or 'substantial' than the other," id. at 80, that serves as the best
support for financial institutions' arguments in favor of realignment. But this characterization is not
an accurate description of the majority's position.
231. Finding the "principal purpose" test to be particularly unhelpful and inflexible, the Second Circuit
has instead adopted the "collision of interests" language from City of Indianapolis when it performs
a realignment analysis. See Md. Cas. Co. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 23 F.3d 617 (2d Cir. 1993). See
also In re Tex. E. Transmission Corp. PCB Contamination Ins. Coverage Litig., 15 F.3d 1230 (3d
Cir. 1994) (although the "principal purpose" is generally appropriate, applying the "substantial
conflicts" approach to realignment in a Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act case); Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co. v. Dow Chem. Co., 44 F. Supp. 2d 870, 874-875 (E.D. Mich.1999) (surveying which circuits
apply the "substantial dispute" and which apply the "principal purpose" test).
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court on the basis of the counterclaim. Understood in its context, however, City of
Indianapolis's loose and imprecise "principal purpose" language gives a court no
license to realign parties simply because the value of the counterclaim exceeds that of
the original claim. Rather, this language was designed to give the court a limited
power to re-position some of the parties from one side to another side in order to
ensure sufficient adversity of interests between the opposing sides. Once that
adversity exists, the power to realign ends. In the context of the counterclaim class
action, the original claim establishes the requisite adversity, and the assertion of the
counterclaim does nothing to dull the competitive edge between the parties.
Therefore, realignment is inappropriate.
City of Indianapolis particularly supports that result in the context of
state-court counterclaim class actions sought to be removed under CAFA. Having
held that realignment was necessary, the Court closed with a policy argument intended
to cinch its holding. Realignment, the Court noted, "must be viewed in the perspective
of the constitutional limitations upon the judicial power of the federal courts." 232 The
"dominant note" in the grants of diversity jurisdiction to the federal courts "is one of
jealous restriction, of avoiding offense to state sensitivities, and of relieving the federal
courts of the overwhelming burden of 'business that intrinsically belongs to the state
courts,' in order to keep them free for their distinctive federal business. 233 And what
case did the Court cite for this proposition? None other than Shamrock Oil,234 which
had held just a few months earlier that counterclaim defendants cannot remove a case
to federal court. Therefore, a counterclaim defendant's attempt to use the realignment
doctrine to vault state-law claims pending in state court into federal court is an
especially ironic misunderstanding and misuse of a limited federal power.
In short, the point of realignment is only to ensure that the requisite diversity
exists. The addition of a counterclaim does nothing to affect the analysis of that
question, for, as we have seen, only the original claims, and not counterclaims, count
for purposes of establishing federal jurisdiction. 23 5 Indeed, a number of federal courts
have held that counterclaims are irrelevant in deciding whether to realign parties. As
explained in Zurn Industries, Inc. v. Acton Construction Co.:
The objective of City of Indianapolis realignment is only to insure that
there is a bona fide dispute between citizens of different states. The
determination of the "primary and controlling matter in dispute" does
not include the cross-claims and counterclaims filed by the
defendants. Instead, it is to be determined by plaintiff's principal
purpose for filing its suit.236
232. City of Indianapolis, 314 U.S. at 76.
233. Id. (quoting Henry J. Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARv. L. REv. 483,
510 (1928).
234. 313 U.S. 100 (1941).
235. See Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 832 (2002); supra nn.
128-137 and accompanying text.
236. 847 F.2d 234, 237 (5th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted).
Other courts are in accord.237
A plaintiff facing a counterclaim class action in state court cannot employ the
realignment doctrine to convert a non-removable case into a removable one. As the
Article has already shown, the plaintiff is also unable to effect removal under sections
1441(a) or 1453(b). Therefore, a counterclaim class action filed in state court will be
adjudicated in state court.
IV. CONCLUSION
CAFA created the concern that little work would be left for state courts in the
field of class actions, and consequently that states would have limited opportunities to
make an impact on developments in the law of class actions - and on developments
in the law of complex litigation more generally. In the main, that concern might prove
valid. Whether originally filed in federal court or removed there from state court,
many class actions that would have been resolved in state court before CAFA are now
being handled in federal court. 238 Whether this loss of class-action competition from
the state laboratories23 9 is outweighed by the policy arguments supporting CAFA's
expansion of federal jurisdiction24 ° is a question that will play out as the federal courts
gain more experience handling the increased load of class actions.
Whatever the ultimate answer to that question, this Article has shown that the
eulogy for state-court class-action practice is a bit premature. In a small corner of
class-action practice - counterclaims brought by classes of consumers against
financial institutions seeking to one of the consumer's debt - state courts will
continue to play the principal role, and will therefore continue to contribute to the
development of the law of class actions. As the Article has also shown, state-court
counterclaim class actions also help us to understand the ambiguities in, and the better
237. MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Logan Group, Inc., 848 F. Supp. 86 (N.D. Tex. 1994); U.S. Fid. & Guar.
Co. v. A & S Mortg. Co., 839 F. Supp. 347 (D. Md. 1993); Olin Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 807 F.
Supp. 1143 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) ("[P]laintiff cites no case where realignment was found to be
appropriate on a counterclaim where the court had proper subject matter jurisdiction over the main
action. "). Federal courts still retain the power to realign a counterclaim as an original claim for
case-management or trial purposes. See e.g. ANR W. Coal Dev. Co. v. Basin Elec. Power Coop.,
276 F.3d 957, 960 (8th Cir. 2002); St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 78 F.3d 202, 204
(5th Cir. 1996); White v. Grinfas, 809 F.2d 1157 (5th Cir. 1987). But that type of realignment,
which is usually based on efficiency concerns, is a far cry from jurisdictional realignment, which is
controlled by City of Indianapolis and its progeny.
238. See supra n. 22 and accompanying text (describing post-CAFA migration of more class actions to
federal courts).
239. See New St. Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) ("It is one of the happy incidents of the
federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and
try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.") (Brandies, J.,
dissenting).
240. For these arguments, see Sen. Rpt. 109-14, at 10-27 (Feb. 28, 2005), (reprinted in 2005
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 11-27). The legislative history evinces Congress's belief that such competition
unduly favored class plaintiffs, and was therefore to be curtailed. Cf Daniel Klerman,
Jurisdictional Competition and the Evolution of the Common Law, 74 U. Cm. L. REv. 1179 (2007)
(arguing that, in seventeenth century England, competition among the royal common-law courts
favored plaintiffs).
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practices for, federal joinder rules,241 and provide a critical lens through which to
understand the proper scope of section 1453(b). 42 These analyses, which flow from a
single and modest aspect of state-court practice, suggest that lawyers, judges, and
scholars who deal with complex litigation in federal court should keep an eye on state
courts for other worthy ideas.
241. See supra Part II.B.
242. See supra Part III.A.2.

